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EVAN R. SEAMONE† 
By separating combat veterans with uniquely military discharges that make 
many ineligible for effective PTSD treatment, the active duty armed forces 
are creating a class of future offenders, specially trained to be lethal, whose 
violent acts against themselves, their families, and the public collectively 
amass more casualties, incur more costs, and drain more resources in the 
homeland than the underlying traumatic episode in the war zone.  The obli-
gation to treat these offenders and help them successfully transition to civil-
ian society with preserved VA benefits before discharge is not merely a laud-
atory goal of therapeutic jurisprudence, but a mandate under the precau-
tionary principle which guides the laws of public health and safety.  To meet 
this obligation, the military must work collaboratively with civilian agencies 
while offenders are still under military control.  Mutual self-preservation 
demands this. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On the heels of various publications observing the high number of 
American inmates with mental illness,1 advocates and academicians have 
spoken against the criminalization of mental illness.2  Many courts have re-
  
 † Major, U.S. Army. Prosecutor, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. This article is based 
upon the author’s presentation at the Nova Southeastern University Shepard Broad Law Cen-
ter’s symposium, Wounds of War: Meeting the Needs of Active-Duty Military Personnel and 
Veterans with Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (Ft. Lauderdale, FL, Feb. 1, 2013).  The per-
spectives in this article, like the perspectives at the presentation, are solely attributable to the 
author’s personal opinions and do not represent the official position of any government agen-
cy, to include the Department of Defense, the Marine Corps, the Army, or the Department of 
Veterans Affairs.  The author would like to thank Professor Kathy Cerminara, Dr. Jonathan 
Shay, and Captain Eric Trudell for their valuable insights.  The author may be contacted by e-
mail at evan.seamone@us.army.mil. 
 1. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ILL-EQUIPPED:  U.S. PRISONS AND OFFENDERS WITH 
MENTAL ILLNESS 1 (2003), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/usa 
1003.pdf. 
 2. See, e.g., MARY BETH PFEIFFER, CRAZY IN AMERICA:  THE HIDDEN TRAGEDY OF OUR 
CRIMINALIZED MENTALLY ILL, at ix–x (2007); E. FULLER TORREY, THE INSANITY OFFENSE: 
HOW AMERICA’S FAILURE TO TREAT THE SERIOUSLY MENTALLY ILL ENDANGERS ITS CITIZENS 
(2008). 
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sponded to this problem with a therapeutic jurisprudence (TJ) model that 
seeks to improve the outcomes of the criminal justice process by enhancing 
the well-being of all parties and society in litigation.3  Specifically, with the 
implementation of diversionary programs at arrest, probationary programs at 
sentencing, and specialized courts that monitor treatment progress, lawmak-
ers and judges have modified the criminal justice system to target the under-
lying psychiatric causes of the misconduct rather than the criminal symptoms 
of their mental illness.4  Although critics may complain about the possibility 
of true criminals getting off easy, for the most part, these deviations in pun-
ishment exist in the recognition that the status quo results in a “‘revolving 
door’” of criminality, endangering society and creating a public health con-
cern of terrible magnitude.5  I fashion this policy as the therapeutic impera-
tive in cases involving mental illness, especially when the offender has not 
been properly diagnosed or treated prior to the criminal offense(s) and inter-
action with the justice system. 
After more than eleven years of sustained combat operations, civilian 
criminal justice systems have embraced veterans—especially combat veter-
ans, particularly those with posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and mild 
traumatic brain injury6 sustained from their faithful service to the nation—as 
  
 3. Evan R. Seamone, The Veterans’ Lawyer as Counselor:  Using Therapeutic Juris-
prudence to Enhance Client Counseling for Combat Veterans with Posttraumatic Stress Dis-
order, 202 MIL. L. REV. 185, 188–90 (2009) (applying the concept of TJ to combat veterans). 
 4. See, e.g., David Loveland & Michael Boyle, Intensive Case Management as a Jail 
Diversion Program for People with a Serious Mental Illness:  A Review of the Literature, 51 
INT’L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 130, 132–33 (2007) (surveying five 
widely adopted methods of diverting offenders with mental illness from the criminal justice 
system and repeat offenses). 
 5. See Evan R. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice:  The 
Suspended Punitive Discharge as a Method to Treat Military Offenders with PTSD and TBI 
and Reduce Recidivism, 208 MIL. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2011) [hereinafter Seamone, Reclaiming 
the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice] (describing the historical evolution of mental 
health courts to effectively reduce recidivism under extremely complicated circumstances). 
 6. See BARRY R. SCHALLER, VETERANS ON TRIAL:  THE COMING COURT BATTLES OVER 
PTSD 9, 41, 205–09 (2012).  PTSD and traumatic brain injury (TBI) are two injuries that have 
separate diagnoses and symptoms.  See id. at 32–36, 41 (discussing the development of 
PTSD’s seventeen diagnostic criteria, as well as TBI); Jennifer J. Vasterling et al., Posttrau-
matic Stress Reactions over Time:  The Battlefield, Homecoming, and Long-Term Course, in 
CARING FOR VETERANS WITH DEPLOYMENT-RELATED STRESS DISORDERS:  IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, 
AND BEYOND 35, 46–47 (Josef I. Ruzek et al. eds., 2011) (discussing causes of PTSD in the 
war zone that create overwhelming sensations of hopelessness and later symptoms that lead to 
difficulties in families and communities); Jozsef Meszaros, Achieving Peace of Mind:  The 
Benefits of Neurobiological Evidence for Battered Women Defendants, 23 YALE J.L. & 
FEMINISM 117, 150–52 (2011) (discussing symptoms of TBI, which results from physical 
trauma to the brain and often influences judgment and decision-making).  Conservative esti-
mates project approximately 300,000 veterans of Iraq and Afghanistan will sustain PTSD.  
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a population deserving of the therapeutic imperative.7  Because the worst 
symptoms of this disorder are often delayed until the veteran returns after 
combat when the body and mind have physically left the chaotic environment 
of the war zone,8 legislators, law enforcement officers, and court personnel 
have recognized that the civil violation often represents the first opportunity 
the offender has to address remnants of their overseas combat experience.9  
  
Summary of INVISIBLE WOUNDS OF WAR:  PSYCHOLOGICAL AND COGNITIVE INJURIES, THEIR 
CONSEQUENCES, AND SERVICES TO ASSIST RECOVERY, at xx–xxi (Terri Tanielian & Lisa H. 
Jaycox eds., 2008), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/mono 
graphs/2008/RAND_MG720.pdf (“[A]pproximately 300,000 individuals [returning from Iraq 
and Afghanistan] currently suffer from PTSD or major depression.”).  Additionally, estimates 
regarding TBI project that Iraq and Afghanistan veterans who have survived attacks by im-
provised explosive devices are at high risk of suffering both TBI and PTSD as co-occurring 
disorders.  David L. Butler et al., Assessment and Treatment in Polytrauma Contexts:  Trau-
matic Brain Injury and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, in CARING FOR VETERANS WITH 
DEPLOYMENT-RELATED STRESS DISORDERS:  IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND BEYOND 87, 88–90 
(Josef I. Ruzek et al. eds., 2011) (discussing instances of comorbid PTSD and TBI). 
 7. See Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
26–27 & nn.69–70 (surveying veteran-specific interventions, including drivers’ license nota-
tions in Georgia and Utah for those diagnosed with PTSD); see also Sean Clark et al., Practice 
Commentary, Development of Veterans Treatment Courts:  Local and Legislative Initiatives, 7 
DRUG CT. REV. 171, 189–94 tbl.2 (2010) (comparing national statutory frameworks tailored to 
veterans in the criminal justice system); Debra A. Pinals, Veterans and the Justice System:  
The Next Forensic Frontier, 38 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 163, 164 (2010) (noting the 
“expanding national agenda” for veteran-specific diversionary programs). 
 8. See Bernice Andrews et al., Delayed-Onset Posttraumatic Stress Disorder:  A Sys-
tematic Review of the Evidence, 164 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1319, 1319 (2007).  Delayed-onset 
PTSD is recognized as a manifestation of the disorder in which symptoms do not emerge for 
months or even years following a servicemember’s combat trauma.  Id. at 1319 (observing 
how this variation was developed as a diagnosis in recognition that “many soldiers do not 
develop symptoms [of PTSD] until they return home, as stress reactions are not adaptive in 
combat”).  As an example, see JOANNA BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING:  FACE-TO-
FACE KILLING IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY WARFARE 212 (Basic Books 1999) [hereinafter 
BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING] (sharing the experience of John Garcia, a WWII 
combat veteran, who is haunted daily by combat experiences in which he “inadvertently killed 
a woman and her infant” 40 years after the event). 
 9. See, e.g., MARGARET E. NOONAN & CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, BUREAU OF JUSTICE 
STATISTICS SPECIAL REPORT:  VETERANS IN STATE AND FEDERAL PRISON, 2004, at 4 (2007), 
available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/vsfp04.pdf (reporting that incarcerated 
veterans, as a whole, are more likely than nonveterans to be first-time offenders).  Attorneys 
in the criminal justice system, specifically defense attorneys, are often the “first responders” to 
untreated PTSD.  Evan R. Seamone, Attorneys as First Responders:  Recognizing the Destruc-
tive Nature of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder on the Combat Veteran’s Legal Decision-Making 
Process, 202 MIL. L. REV. 144, 145–46 (2009) [hereinafter Seamone, Attorneys as First-
Responders].  Further, veterans treatment courts, which feature treatment alternatives and 
diversionary programs for veteran offenders specifically operate on the “unspoken assump-
 
4
Nova Law Review, Vol. 37, Iss. 3 [2013], Art. 4
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol37/iss3/4
2013] AMERICA’S LARGEST SLEEPER CELL 483 
In light of growing reports of active duty suicide,10 failures to diagnose 
servicemembers, inadequacy of PTSD screening, and some indication of 
incentives for mental health professionals to conserve budgets by labeling 
PTSD as something less serious,11 the civilian criminal justice system often 
functions as a surrogate for active duty mental health triage and treatment 
when it inherits a military offender.12  Arguably, this embrace of veterans 
represents a tacit agreement between civil society and the active armed forc-
es; the criminal justice system has begun to pick up the pieces for veterans 
who are in the greatest need—as evidenced by the sheer destructiveness of 
their offenses—in recognition that the primary mission of the armed forces is 
combat, that the services must always be ready to fight, and that rehabilita-
tion by the active armed forces may often serve to impair the military mis-
sion.13 
Veterans raise special public health concerns because of their training.  
Combat veterans who have perfected the art of using their hands and weap-
ons to take lives in the quickest and most devastating manner, and who have 
developed a mental mindset that has allowed them to rationalize this behav-
ior in practice over time,14 are as lethal to bystanders, law enforcement offic-
  
tion” that the military has failed to meet their treatment needs.  SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 
208, 211. 
 10. See, e.g., RAJEEV RAMCHAND ET AL., THE WAR WITHIN:  PREVENTING SUICIDE IN THE 
U.S. MILITARY, at iii (2011), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/ 
pubs/monographs/2011/RAND_MG953.pdf (discussing notable and recent trends). 
 11. See Keegan Hamilton, Mind Field:  PTSD & the Military, SEATTLE NEWS (Aug. 8, 
2012), http://www.seattleweekly.com/2012-08-08/news/mind-field-ptsd-the-military/ (report-
ing on internal memoranda at Madigan Army Medical Center in which administrators encour-
aged Army psychiatrists to downgrade PTSD to adjustment disorder because a diagnosis 
could “burden [taxpayers] as much as $1.5 million for a single soldier over the course of his or 
her lifetime”). 
 12. SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 208 (“The failure of current [military] support systems 
has left it to the states and cities to fill in the gaps . . . .”); see also Todd Brewster, Foreword 
to BARRY R. SCHALLER, VETERANS ON TRIAL:  THE COMING COURT BATTLES OVER PTSD, at 
ix, xiii (2012) (“Courts, after all, don’t see the evidence of such trauma until a crime is com-
mitted, when it may already be too late.”). 
 13. U.S. ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 17 (1955) (“[I]t is the primary business of 
[all] armies and navies to fight or be ready to fight wars should the occasion arise.”); see also 
discussion infra Part II (describing rationales for this abdication of rehabilitative responsibil-
ity). 
 14. See Preface to RICHARD A. GABRIEL, NO MORE HEROES:  MADNESS & PSYCHIATRY IN 
WAR, at prefatory note (1987) (quoting WWII Marine Corps veteran William Manchester:  
“You’re dealing here with complicated psychological states.  No man in battle is really sane.  
The mind-set of the soldier on the battlefield is a highly disturbed mind, and this is an epidem-
ic of insanity which affects everybody there, and those not afflicted by it die very quickly.”); 
see also BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING, supra note 8, at 102 (describing the 
positions of military psychiatrists who banked on the effect of stress-induced madness, reason-
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ers, and victims as they are to foreign enemies when the symptoms of their 
mental illness result in or contribute to loss of impulse control or violence.15  
Yet, public safety, alone, is not the only motivator for the therapeutic impera-
tive.16  A review of the enabling legislation for the growing number of veter-
ans treatment courts throughout the nation—currently180,17  with many more 
in the planning stages, highlights the unifying determining factor; as it relates 
to the treatment of veterans in the civilian criminal justice system, the thera-
peutic imperative derives more than anything from a moral obligation to 
repay the country’s wounded warriors for their debts.18 
The pivotal question raised by civil society’s willingness (or de facto 
role) to catch the stray servicemembers who slip through the cracks is 
whether this tacit agreement acts as an incentive for the military to bypass the 
legitimate mental health care needs of servicemembers.19  With an eye to-
ward the prevention of PTSD and traumatic brain injury (TBI) related mis-
  
ing “that combat soldiers who began fearing that they would ‘crack’ under the strain would 
attempt to destroy the threat as [soon] as possible and, in a fit of ‘desperate aggression,’ often 
acted heroically.”). 
 15. See, e.g., JERRY LAVELY ET AL., COMBAT VETERAN DOMESTIC CRISIS RESPONSE: LAW 
ENFORCEMENT DE-ESCALATION OPTIONS 3 (McCormick Foundation 2009) (observing how 
symptomatic veterans present a “unique threat to law enforcement”); Christopher Weaver et 
al., Enhancing Services Response to Crisis Incidents Involving Veterans: A Role for Law 
Enforcement and Mental Health Collaboration, 10 Psychological Servs. 66, 68 (2013) (“Vet-
erans are often trained in combat, weapons, and policing tactics, and may have wartime prac-
tice using these skills.  In fact, veterans’ skills in these areas may be equal or superior to those 
of responding officers.”). See also discussion infra Part IV. 
 16. See discussion infra Part IV.; see also Viewpoints on Veterans Affairs and Related 
Issues:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of the H. Comm. on 
Veterans’ Affairs, 103d Cong. 15 (1994) (testimony of Jonathan Shay, M.D., Ph.D.) [hereinaf-
ter Shay Testimony]. 
 17. Comments of Hon. Eric Shinseki, Sec. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, Keynote Address to 
the General Session of the 143rd Congress of Corrections, Am. Correctional Ass’n..  National 
Harbor, Md (Aug. 12, 2013).  See also The History, JUST. FOR VETS, http://www. 
justiceforvets.org/vtc-history (last visited Apr. 21, 2013). 
 18. See, e.g., Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra 
note 5, at 18 n.41 (describing how the many veterans’ initiatives developed in state judicial 
systems “exist to address issues related exclusively to [wounds incurred during] the offender’s 
active duty military service”).  Psychiatrist Jonathan Shay, a Department of Veterans Affairs 
(VA) expert in combat PTSD, explains that combat veterans “have an absolute moral claim” 
on society that “goes right back to the War of Independence” for the simple reason that they 
were wounded by the enemy in service of their nation.  Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 15. 
 19. In his recent book, retired Connecticut Supreme Court Justice Barry Schaller argues 
that responsibility for adequate treatment prior to discharge rests solely with the military and 
not the civilian courts, which have been transformed into responders of last-resort by the 
military’s hasty and inadequate efforts to discharge wounded warriors.  SCHALLER, supra note 
6, at 200, 263 (“The goal must be to prevent problems of readjustment rather than expect 
civilian society to deal with them after they occur.”). 
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conduct, this article answers the question in the affirmative; active duty of-
fenders with PTSD are routinely neglected for effective treatment with the 
expectation that civil society will address the problem following discharge 
and that discipline is the primary ideology to be served.20  This is troubling, 
foremost, because many of the underlying assumptions in the military disci-
plinary framework are terribly flawed and the end result is a soldier, sailor, 
airman, marine, or coastie (collectively “troop”) so crippled by the indelible 
brand of the military’s discharge process that even civil society may find it 
impossible to provide necessary help once his or her separation from the 
military is complete. 
This article applies the principles of TJ to the punishment of active duty 
military offenders with PTSD and TBI who exist in a disciplinary structure 
that is distinct from the civilian justice system and serves very different 
ends.21  I argue that TJ, in this atypical military realm, is mandated not simp-
ly by the ideological goal to treat rather than punish offenders with legitimate 
mental health care needs for the betterment of society at large, but more im-
portantly, that TJ embodies a precautionary principle in public health and 
public safety that overrides simply the moral imperative never to leave a 
fallen comrade behind.22  Through the recognition of why it is absolutely 
necessary for military commanders to adapt the disciplinary structure to in-
corporate TJ, civil society can properly distinguish its responsibilities from 
the military’s, with more optimal results for both entities and all concerned 
parties.  To better understand the nature of this important and obscured prob-
lem, Part II begins by identifying the crux of the active duty problem:  How 
discipline now trumps treatment and the various statutory and regulatory 
escape hatches that have allowed such prioritization, even when a military 
offender has a diagnosed service-connected mental health disorder.23  This is 
problematic because it not only delays the ability to effectively treat symp-
toms, but also aggravates existing ones in the process. 
Part III describes the crippling less-than-honorable military discharge 
characterizations linked to misconduct and their effect in terminating health 
care benefits and generating societal stigmas, as well as handicaps that are 
unique to ex-servicemembers, but universal in their devastation.24  This Mili-
tary Misconduct Catch-22 becomes an impetus for recidivism in civil socie-
ty, translating commanders’ well-meaning intentions to enforce good order 
  
 20. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 21. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 22. Important as it may be, the moral obligation alone may not be enough to motivate 
military action because it clashes with other conflicting obligations, explored below in Part V. 
 23. See discussion infra Part II.A–D. 
 24. See discussion infra Part III. 
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and discipline into the basis for undermining the safety of the very society 
they are sworn to protect.  Normally, deference to the military’s unique at-
tributes or the invocation of other competing interests might permit it to de-
flect concerns about compassion, sympathy, and mercy.25  Part IV, however, 
borrows a page from international law and homeland security to highlight 
why TJ is necessary under the precautionary principle in public health—
despite many questions that simply cannot be answered at the present time.26  
By highlighting the interrelationship between TJ and the precautionary prin-
ciple in a military disciplinary framework, this article further reveals the 
adaptability of TJ to other fields where it might, at first, seem facially in-
compatible, such as regulation of human behavior in the mitigation of infec-
tious disease transmission, transboundary disasters, counterterrorism, and 
other public health crises.27 
II. THE UNCOMPROMISING MANTRA OF “GOOD ORDER AND DISCIPLINE” 
IN THE ARMED FORCES 
Ground forces have an objective to obliterate the enemy face-to-face 
and hand-to-hand when mortars, rifles, and bayonets fail, while advancing on 
enemy positions.28  In the profession of arms, dangerous duty requires a dif-
ferent, harsher type of leadership than civilian occupations, aptly defined by 
President Truman to the Cadet Corps of the United States Military Academy 
as “that quality which can make other men do what they do not want to do, 
and like it.”29  Similar to a basic training ideology, which uses coercion to 
break (mostly) teenagers out of an independent mindset and replace their 
prior values with a singular ideology of “unquestion[ed] obedience,” contin-
ued service in the ground forces necessarily involves threats and frequent 
public use of discipline to remind all team members that they must work to-
  
 25. See discussion infra Part III (describing common justifications for ambivalence to 
wounded warrior offenders, including lack of ability to prove causation between PTSD and 
criminal acts, assumption of risk for invisible wounds in a volunteer military, and the ease of 
malingering PTSD for secondary gain). 
 26. See discussion infra Part IV. 
 27. See discussion infra Part III. 
 28. See, e.g., BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING, supra note 8, at xiv. 
 29. President Harry S. Truman, Remarks to the Cadet Corps at West Point (Sept. 28, 
1946), http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1760&st=&st1=; see also 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 22-100, MILITARY LEADERSHIP 7 (1958), available 
at www.cgsc.edu/CARL/docrepository/FM22_100_1958.pdf (“Military leadership.  The art of 
influencing and directing men in such a way as to obtain their willing obedience, confidence, 
respect, and loyal cooperation in order to accomplish the mission.”). 
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gether and obey orders.30  There is a reason why commanders often display 
the results of administrative punishment under the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice (UCMJ) within the hallways of their platoon and company orderly 
rooms:31  Discipline must happen harshly and swiftly because lives may be 
on the line if and when it is questioned.32  This is an outgrowth of the guiding 
historical military leadership principle that, to win wars, “men must fear their 
officers more than death from the enemy.”33 
 
A.   The Armed Forces Are More Likely to Criminalize Mental Illness With 
Uniquely-Military Offenses Tied to Work Performance 
 
Life in the military is dominated by an endless set of rules, schedules, 
and suspense dates, each of which is conveyed through verbal or written or-
ders from a superior of one type or another.  Violations of these orders, no 
matter how trivial they might seem, make any subordinate service-member 
liable for punishment, which can include a federal criminal conviction, time 
in jail, and a punitive discharge.  For example, if an officer directs a junior 
enlisted soldier to stand at the position of attention while being addressed, 
and she willingly fails to do so, her criminal act, “[w]illfully disobeying a . . . 
superior commissioned officer,” under Article 90 of the UCMJ, could tech-
nically earn her up to a “[d]ishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and 
allowances, . . . confinement for [five] years,” and reduction to the lowest 
enlisted grade.34  Even more unforgiving, if a general officer has developed a 
policy that requires or prohibits certain behavior, the service-member can be 
convicted of violating a lawful general order, even if she had never had no-
  
 30. ANNI BAKER, LIFE IN THE U.S. ARMED FORCES:  (NOT) JUST ANOTHER JOB 25 (2008); 
see generally Robert J. Stevenson, The Officer-Enlisted Distinction and Patterns of Organiza-
tional Reaction to Social Deviance in the U.S. Military, 68 SOC. FORCES 1191, 1191, 1193 
(1990) (examining trends in military discipline during WWII, the Korean War, and Vietnam, 
and concluding that military superiors exert control through punishment, which occurs at 
increasing frequencies the more the leadership is called into question). 
 31. This is based on personal experience of the author, who has served primarily as a 
military prosecutor over the last eleven years. 
 32. See, e.g., Swaim v. United States, 28 Ct. Cl. 173, 221 (1893) (“The power to com-
mand depends upon discipline, and discipline depends upon the power to punish . . . .”); Rich-
ard C. Harding, A Revival in Military Justice:  An Introduction by the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral, REPORTER, Summer 2010, at 4, 5 (discussing the indispensability of “‘military disci-
pline’” and “‘good order and discipline’” in achieving the objectives of the profession of 
arms). 
 33. GABRIEL, supra note 14, at 103. 
 34. MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL UNITED STATES, at IV-21, A2-17 (2012) [hereinafter 
MCM], available at http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/MCM-2012.pdf; see 10 
U.S.C. § 890(2) (2006). 
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tice of its contents, thus exposing her to up to a “[d]ishonorable discharge, 
forfeiture of all pay and allowances, . . . confinement for [two] years,” and 
reduction to the lowest enlisted grade, pursuant to Article 92 of the UCMJ.35 
Commanders, of course, are not required to press charges and pursue 
the full extent of punishment for all offenses.36  Furthermore, one cannot 
receive a Bad-Conduct Discharge (BCD) unless the issue has been elevated 
through higher channels from the recommending commander to a military 
judge or panel.37  Problematically, because individual commanders have such 
wide discretion to initiate different levels of punishment, no one knows for 
sure what to expect.  Today might just happen to be the day when the com-
mander and the military panel desire to set an example for other impression-
able troops and obtain a necessary deterrent.  The fact that commanders and 
military panels have equally been criticized for being too lenient and too 
harsh on offenders reveals a lack of consistent standards in punishment and 
the possibility for abuse of discretion.38  Likewise, the lack of any known 
minimum punishments for all but a handful of egregious offenses often pres-
sures servicemembers to waive their rights to full-blown courts-martial in 
favor of lesser administrative action, including the ominous administrative 
  
 35. MCM, supra note 34, at IV-25; 10 U.S.C. § 892(1).  The Manual specifically states, 
“knowledge of a general order or regulation need not be alleged or proved, as knowledge is 
not an element of this offense and a lack of knowledge does not constitute a defense.”  MCM, 
supra note 34, at IV-24.  In the military case of United States v. Webster, the court observed 
that the effect of this punitive article was to “creat[e] . . . what amounts to ‘strict liability’ for 
the unwary.”  37 M.J. 670, 677 (C.G.C.M.R. 1993). 
 36. Marshall L. Wilde, Incomplete Justice:  Unintended Consequences of Military 
Nonjudicial Punishment, 60 A.F. L. REV. 115, 129 (2007).  While the military articulates 
maximum punishments, there are few minimums and commanders always have the option to 
pursue nonpunitive means, such as corrective training to address infractions.  See id. (describ-
ing broad commander discretion on punishment and few rules about how to exercise it).  Even 
at a court-martial, “there’s no minimum sentence.  So for example, if someone were convicted 
of rape, they could get a sentence from no punishment all the way up to life imprisonment.”  
United States v. Schlamer, 52 M.J. 80, 88 (C.A.A.F. 1999) (quoting a military judge’s com-
ment to panel member).  For further discussion, see Megan N. Schmid, This Court-Martial 
Hereby (Arbitrarily) Sentences You:  Problems with Court Member Sentencing in the Military 
and Proposed Solutions, 67 A.F. L. REV. 245 (2011). 
 37. See MCM, supra note 34, at II-128. 
 38. See generally PATRICK CALLHAN, MILITARY INJUSTICE 97-109 (2013) (describing the 
prevailing biases that influence commanders to pursue overly-punitive consequences for mili-
tary offenders).  As just one example, military records demonstrate that African-Americans 
and servicemembers of other minority groups received disproportionately higher numbers of 
stigmatizing discharges during Vietnam than white offenders punished for the same offenses.  
LAWRENCE M. BASKIR & WILLIAM A. STRAUSS, CHANCE AND CIRCUMSTANCE:  THE DRAFT, 
THE WAR, AND THE VIETNAM GENERATION 139 (1978) (describing evidence of racial bias in 
the discharge system). 
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discharge under Other Than Honorable Conditions (OTH) (which existed 
before 1976 as the Undesirable Discharge (UD)).39 
 
B.  Disciplinary Standards Lack Consistency Based on Individual Com-
manders’ Preferences and Philosophies 
 
With this very brief snapshot of military justice in mind, commentators 
have rightfully raised concerns that the military is far more likely to crimi-
nalize mental illness than the civilian justice system.40  As one attorney who 
works with wounded warriors has cautioned:  “Consider all the hoopla about 
the [Department of Defense] increasing the disability rating for PTSD. . . . 
Odds are, if you have PTSD, they are probably going to kick you out for a 
pattern of misconduct so you won’t be getting paid disability anyway.”41  
Putting aside the common symptom of self-medication with controlled sub-
stances or alcohol, and related offenses,42 PTSD symptoms tied to irritability 
and hyper-alertness often result in decreased work performance (i.e., the ina-
bility to maintain concentration working on monotonous or complicated 
tasks, outbursts in frustration, lateness for assigned duties).43  Unlike the ci-
vilian environment, each of these manifestations is a crime in the military.44  
And, with the armed forces being the occupation with the greatest levels of 
  
 39. See, e.g., Vanessa Baehr-Jones, A “Catch-22” for Mentally-Ill Military Defendants:  
Plea-Bargaining Away Mental Health Benefits, 204 MIL. L. REV. 51, 51–52, 54 (2010) (de-
scribing incentives for offenders with PTSD to plea-bargain away their benefits in exchange 
for lesser administrative punishment once commanders have instituted court-martial charges). 
 40. See Amanda Carpenter, Navy Doctor Warns:  Misconduct May Be Symptom of Stress 
Disorder, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2010, at A1.  According to a senior ranking Navy psychia-
trist, “[t]he service may be discharging soldiers for misconduct when in fact they are merely 
displaying symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder.”  Id. (citing a widely-distributed 2007 
memorandum). 
 41. Carissa Picard, Military Misconduct, MYSPACE (Jan. 18, 2009, 4:29 AM), 
http://www.myspace.com/looking4ladybugs/blog/464671591. 
 42. See, e.g., Pinals, supra note 7, at 164 (discussing common co-occurring conditions 
that accompany most PTSD diagnoses); Greg Barnes, When War Comes Home:  Crime Surge 
Among Veterans Suggest Some Didn’t Leave Horrors Behind, FAYOBSERVER.COM (Feb. 5, 
2012, 1:49 AM), http://www.fayobserver.com/articles/2012/02/05/1151825 (noting an Army 
statistic that “25 . . . to 35 percent of wounded soldiers are addicted to prescription or illegal 
drugs while they await medical discharge”). 
 43. Gregg Zoroya, Battle Stress May Lead to Misconduct, USA TODAY, July 2, 2007, at 
A5 [hereinafter Zoroya, Battle Stress] (citing Captain William Nash for the proposition that, 
due to PTSD, “[i]t can be very, very hard for [marines] to really care even about obeying the 
rules”); Picard, supra note 41 (“[S]ymptoms of PTSD . . . make it difficult for affected 
servicemembers to comply with and conform to the military’s strict code of conduct.”). 
 44. See Carpenter, supra note 40; Picard, supra note 41. 
11
Seamone: Dismantling America's Largest Sleeper Cell: The Imperative to Tre
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
490 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
stress,45 and thus PTSD risk, the signature injuries of the Iraq and Afghani-
stan wars have unwittingly transformed many patients in need of legitimate 
medical care into offenders in need of discipline in the eyes of their military 
superiors.  Commonly, any of the following phenomenon related to Opera-
tional Stress Injuries (OSIs)46 can result in behavior that is simultaneously 
symptomatic and criminal: 
 
• “dissociative episode[s]”;  
• “shattered assumptions of moral order”; 
• “thrill or sensation-seeking behavior”; 
• “self-punishment”; 
• “moral injury”; 
• “violent behavior occurring in a sleep-state in response to vivid 
nightmares”; or 
• “adverse reactions to psychotropic medications during the course 
of treatment for mental conditions.”47 
 
While the military has officially recognized the connection between 
service-connected stress conditions and misconduct48—both on the battle-
  
 45. See Victoria Brienza, The 10 Most Stressful Jobs of 2012, CAREERCAST, 
http://www.careercast.com/jobs-rated/10-most-stressful-jobs-2012 (last visited April 21, 
2013) (identifying the “enlisted soldier” as the most stressful occupation above firefighters, 
police, and even airline pilots). 
 46. While PTSD garners the bulk of attention, it is not the only combat-related condition 
that results in criminal offending.  Often, those who do not qualify for a full-blown diagnosis 
of PTSD suffer symptoms more acutely than those with the PTSD diagnosis.  
ShirleyMcPherson-Sexton & Brandon Hostetler, How to Respond to the Crisis Victim with 
PTSD Symptoms: An Intervener’s Guide, 9 J. POLICE CRISIS NEGOTIATIONS 61, 62 (2009).  For 
this reason, the military and civilian criminal justice systems must be cognizant of the prob-
lems facingservicemembers and veterans with other disorders too.  This surely includes “acute 
anxiety disorders,” “adjustment disorders,” “family violence,” and even “hostility.”  Peter J. 
Cosgrove, Forward to MILITARY STRESS AND PERFORMANCE: THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENSE 
FORCE, at xv (George E. Kearney et al. eds., 2003).  It is important, therefore, to consider all 
Operational Stress Injuries, which are simply defined as “any persistent psychological diffi-
culty resulting from operational duties performed by a [military] member.”  Operational Stress 
Injury Social Support, The Invisible Wounds, The Official Definition of an OSI, 
http://www.osiss.ca/ engraph/def_e.asp?sidecat=1 (last visited Oct. 26, 2013). 
47.  John W. Brooker et al., Beyond “T.B.D.”: Understanding VA’s Evaluation of a Former 
Servicemember’s Benefit Eligibility Following Involuntary or Punitive Discharge from the 
Armed Forces, 214 Mil. L. Rev. 1, 253-55 (2012). 
 48. See, e.g., Letter from Peter W. Chiarelli, General, United States Army, to Leaders, in 
U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY 2020:  GENERATING HEALTH & DISCIPLINE IN THE FORCE 
AHEAD OF THE STRATEGIC RESET (2012), available at http://www.armyg1.army. 
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field49 and in manifestations after troops have returned home50—and has 
urged commanders to at least consider mental conditions before taking disci-
plinary action,51 the need for deterrence, group examples, and unquestioned 
obedience still allows commanders to disregard the current and future treat-
  
mil/hr/suicide/docs/army_2020_generating_health_and_discipline_in_the_force_report_2012
_GOLD_BOOK.pdf. 
One of the most important lessons learned in recent years is that we cannot simply 
deal with health or discipline in isolation; these issues are interrelated and will re-
quire interdisciplinary solutions.  For example, a Soldier committing domestic vio-
lence may be suffering from undiagnosed post-traumatic stress.  He may also be 
abusing alcohol in an attempt to self medicate to relieve his symptoms.  The reality is 
there are a significant number of Soldiers with a foot in both camps—health and discipline—
who will require appropriate health referrals and disciplinary accountability. 
Id. 
 49. See U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 22-51, LEADERS’ MANUAL FOR 
COMBAT STRESS CONTROL, at 4-1 to 4-20 (1994) [hereinafter FM 22-51], available at 
http://www.enlisted.info/field-manuals/fm-22-51-leaders-manual-for-combat-stress-
control.shtml.  The term most commonly used is “combat stress,” and an Army field manual 
devotes an entire chapter to it.  See id.  The chapter identifies a number of criminal behaviors 
linked to combat stress and the manual goes on to distinguish how the same forces might 
generate positive and misconduct stress: 
 Positive combat stress behaviors and misconduct stress behaviors are to some extent a 
double-edged sword or two sides of the same coin.  The same physiological and psychological 
processes that result in heroic bravery in one situation can produce criminal acts such as atroci-
ties against enemy prisoners and civilians in another.  Stress may drag the sword down in the 
direction of the misconduct edge, while sound, moral leadership and military training and dis-
cipline must direct it upward toward positive behaviors. 
Id. at 3-12 & fig.3-1. 
 50. See TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, DEP’T OF DEF., AN ACHIEVABLE VISION:  
REPORT OF THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH 22 (2007), availa-
ble at http://dtf.defense.gov/rwtf/dodtfmentalhealth2007.pdf.  A recent Task Force report 
observed various PTSD-linked “complex disinhibitory behaviors” likely to result in criminal 
offenses following the return from combat.  See id. (citing “[d]ifficulty controlling one’s emo-
tions, including irritability and anger . . ., [s]elf-medicat[ion] with . . . illicit drugs in an at-
tempt to return to ‘normalcy,’ [and] reckless/high risk behaviors” which might occur “months 
after the battlefield injury or trauma”). 
 51. See, e.g., ARMY BD. FOR CORR. OF MILITARY RECORDS, RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS 
AR20120022346 (2013), available at http://boards.law.af.mil/ARMY/BCMR/ 
CY2012/20120022346.txt (requiring the commanding general to “address whether the Sol-
dier’s medical condition is the direct or substantial contributing cause of the conduct that led 
to the recommendation for administrative separation, and/or whether other circumstances of 
the individual case warrant disability processing instead of further processing for administra-
tive separation” in all cases where a Medical Evaluation Board has determined that an official 
disability rating for medical conditions is warranted).  Sadly, the requirement neither explains 
how to determine the link between the misconduct and the medical condition and the miscon-
duct, nor requires the commander to take favorable action even when the link is present.  See 
id.  Additionally, the requirement only applies to those cases that have completed the initial 
Medical Evaluation Board process, which could take over a year, and only those cases that 
have been favorably recommended by the Board for further processing.  See id. 
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ment needs of their offending subordinates.  Not only has the military failed 
to institute recommendations that would assist them in providing treatment 
rather than punishment,52 various escape clauses provide commanders with 
ways to evade existing mandates designed to provide needed treatment.53 
Publicly, the premium on punishing offenders with known mental 
health conditions is the greatest proof that misconduct trumps care, even 
when that misconduct arose from “good, even heroic, soldiers.”54  Consider, 
for example, the representative response of the United States Army’s Special 
Operations Command when its commander was criticized for prosecuting a 
soldier with PTSD:  “Nowhere in our four major criteria for PTSD does it 
allow for breaking the law.”55  Ponder the Army and the Marine Corps cases 
in which an officer and an enlisted servicemember had charges brought 
against them—one case resulting in a punitive BCD and 180 days confine-
ment—for failed attempts at suicide while suffering from a diagnosed mental 
health condition.56  Although the military’s highest court ultimately invali-
  
 52. See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 40 (reporting the Marine Corps’ rejection of the rec-
ommendation for all post-deployment offenders to be screened for PTSD prior to the determi-
nation to pursue adverse action). 
 53. Kelly Kennedy, PTSD Victim Booted for ‘Misconduct,’ ARMY TIMES, (Jan. 7, 2009, 
12:55 PM), http://www.armytimes.com/news/2009/01/military_ptsd_discharge_010709w/ 
(copy on file with Nova Law Review) (statement of retired Army Lieutenant Colonel Mike 
Parker:  “‘Even though they have this new regulation saying they can’t kick [a troop] out for 
personality disorders, they can still kick [PTSD-afflicted servicemembers] out for misconduct’ 
. . . . ‘Everything they say, they have an escape clause.’”). 
 54. FM 22-51, supra note 49, at 2-9(c); see also id. at 2-10 (“Excellent combat soldiers 
may commit misconduct stress behaviors in reaction to the stressors of combat before, during, 
or after their otherwise exemplary performance.  Combat stress, even with good combat be-
havior, does not excuse criminal acts.”).  For example, a recent military report “considers the 
misconduct discharges ‘good news’ because they lead to better discipline within the ranks” 
but essentially ignores “what happens to those soldiers after they leave the Army, often with 
other-than-honorable discharges that bar them from receiving military benefits.”  Barnes, 
supra note 42. 
 55. Carpenter, supra note 40 (citing the comments of the United States Army’s Special 
Operations Command’s chief of media and community relations Carol Darby). 
 56. Marine Fights Military Conviction for Suicide Attempt, FOX NEWS (Feb. 2, 2012), 
http://www.foxnews.com/us/2012/02/02/marine-fights-military-conviction-for-suicide-
attempt/; The Case of Lt. Whiteside:  When It Comes to the Psychological Wounds a War 
Inflicts, the Army Still Doesn’t Get It, WASH. POST, Dec. 6, 2007, at A28.  Former Marine 
Lazzaric T. Caldwell was convicted for his self-harm and sentenced to a BCD and 180 days 
confinement.  Marine Fights Military Conviction for Suicide Attempt, supra.  As he awaits the 
results of his appeal, he is not receiving mental health treatment for his diagnosed PTSD be-
cause of his discharge.  Id.  He reasons, “[s]eeing the kind of state I was in, there should have 
been a way of getting help instead of just punishment.”  Id.  Army Lieutenant Elizabeth 
Whiteside fared a bit better in her case.  See The Case of Lt. Whiteside, supra.  Whiteside’s 
command criminally charged her for shooting herself in the stomach after a series of stressful 
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dated this outcome, the practices that led to this initial punishment provide an 
important window into a larger disciplinary philosophy.57 
Society, legislators, military courts, and commanders have often ex-
plained these “absurd,”58 “unjust and irrational,”59 byproducts of the military 
justice system—replete with its purely military offenses—on four policy 
grounds.60 
  
events in Baghdad and “[d]espite the unequivocal judgment of psychiatrists that she suffers 
from significant mental illness.”  Id.  Although charges were eventually dropped after media 
publicity and she received a General Discharge, Whiteside again attempted suicide following 
her charges.  Events Surrounding the Case of 1st Lt. Elizabeth Whiteside, WASH. POST (Jan. 
30, 2008 2:19 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/01/30/ 
AR2008013002250_pf.html.  She provides a personal account of her psychotic break on The 
Washington Post’s website.  Id.  The offense supporting such charges is codified in Article 
134 of the UCMJ as “[s]elf-injury without intent to avoid service” and bears a punishment that 
includes up to five years confinement and a Dishonorable Discharge (DD).  10 U.S.C. § 934 
(2006); MCM, supra note 34, at IV-129.  Upon considering Private Caldwell’s appeal, a ma-
jority of the Navy and Marine Corps Court of Criminal Appeals upheld the conviction, finding 
that bloodletting from his two slashed wrists caused a substantial mess and required a re-
sponse that was prejudicial to good order and discipline.  United States v. Caldwell, 70 M.J. 
630, 632 (N-M. Ct. Crim. App. 2011), aff’d in part and reversed in part, 72 M.J. 137 
(C.A.A.F. 2013)..  They continued: 
 As to the public policy argument, we are not persuaded that criminal prosecu-
tion of genuine suicide attempts should be prohibited under military law. . . . If a 
[commander] feels it necessary to resort to court-martial to address this type of lead-
ership challenge, he or she should be allowed to do so . . . . 
Id. at 633. 
     57. United States v. Caldwell, 72 M.J. 137, 141-42 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (finding insufficient 
evidence to show that this particular Marine’s acts of cutting his wrists had a palpable nega-
tive effect on good order and discipline within the unit or was service-discrediting, but con-
firming the viability of the charge in other circumstances).  
 58. Kennedy, supra note 53. 
 59. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 117. 
I . . . find the situation of veterans with “bad paper”[—being denied mental health 
treatment—]to be as unjust and irrational as if they had been drummed out for fail-
ure to stand at attention after their feet had been blown off.  Most of these men 
committed offenses because of their combat PTSD. 
Id. 
 60. See infra Part II. 
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C.   The Four Bases for Ambivalence to the Mental Health Treatment 
Needs of Military Offenders 
1. There Is Not Enough Research to Demonstrate an Absolute Causal Link 
Between PTSD and Misconduct.  Hence, It Would Be Counterproductive to 
Assume the Connection in All Cases. 
Even the leading psychiatrists in the nation agree that knowledge about 
PTSD is still in its infantile stages.61  The recently-revised diagnostic criteria 
in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders (DSM-5), 
therefore provide poor guidance to the criminal courts and the legal profes-
sion, which require objective and reliable diagnostic standards.62  As the 
mental health profession learns more, standards necessarily change.  A con-
sequence of this is the lack of studies providing definitive answers, the need 
for more studies to eliminate inconsistencies and contradictions based on the 
populations studied, and an abundance of tentative and qualified suggestions 
about causation.63  It is no wonder that, in this environment of uncertainty 
and soft science, there are similar problems linking PTSD to misconduct.64 
  
 61. See, e.g., Josef I. Ruzek et al., Introduction:  Addressing the Mental Health Needs of 
Active-Duty Personnel and Veterans, in CARING FOR VETERANS WITH DEPLOYMENT-RELATED 
STRESS DISORDERS:  IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND BEYOND 3, 5 (Josef I. Ruzek et al. eds., 2011) 
(recognizing that the “accelerating rate of change in the mental health support mission, will 
challenge all of us to move toward continually learning better ways to serve those who return 
from these wars [with PTSD]”). 
 62. See SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 9 (“The [Diagnostic and Statistical Manual’s 
(“DSM”)] definition of PTSD remains a moving target, with the disorder undergoing changes 
in each revision of the manual.”).  Justice Schaller defines five common concerns with the 
present criterion in the 2000 Text Revision of the DSM:  “(1) trauma concept; (2) assumption 
of a specific trauma factor; (3) lack of specificity of the criteria, namely, that they overlap 
with too many other disorders; (4) criterion creep or spread into too many diverse situations; 
and (5) excessive malingering encouraged by the formulation, which corrupts legitimate use 
of the diagnosis.”  Id. at 201.  For the current edition of the DSM, see AM. PSYCHIATRIC 
ASS’N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS: DSM-5, 
at 271-80, Criterion 309.81 (5th ed. 2013). 
 63. In the Institute of Medicine’s analysis, a panel of subject matter experts in PTSD 
could, at best, only conclude that “there is limited but suggestive evidence of an association 
between deployment to a war zone and later incarceration.”  6 INST. OF MED., GULF WAR AND 
HEALTH:  PHYSIOLOGIC, PSYCHOLOGIC, AND PSYCHOSOCIAL EFFECTS OF DEPLOYMENT-
RELATED STRESS 306 (2008), available at http://www.iom.edu/reports/2007/gulf-war-health-
vol-6-physiologic-psychologic-psychosocial-effects-deployment-related-stress. 
 64. See John Hoellwarth, Linking Misconduct with PTSD, MARINE CORPS TIMES, July 2, 
2007, at 13 (reporting the conclusions of a senior psychiatrist researcher at the Marine “Corps’ 
first Combat Operational Stress Control Conference” in 2007 regarding the possible correla-
tion between PTSD and crime:  “‘[W]e do not yet have the good data to discern how big the 
problem is, what contributes to it and how we can deal with it’”).  As recently as 2012, a team 
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Even where a troop unquestionably suffers from PTSD, his or her of-
fense may not have a connection to the disorder.  Prosecutors scoff at the 
defendant who argues that PTSD caused him to “‘get in a boat, sail it across 
the [A]tlantic and then try to take back ten thousand poun[d]s of hashish,’” 
echoing scholars’ conclusions that the causation requirement is the biggest 
obstacle to succeeding on the PTSD defense.65  In a court of law, as well as 
the court of public opinion, the defense must demonstrate that the PTSD re-
action occurred at the time of the criminal behavior and was the motivating 
force responsible for it.66 
Inevitably, PTSD affects individuals differently, making general state-
ments about causation useless in a given case.67  The flip-side of this conclu-
sion is the fact that PTSD reactions can and certainly do occur in discernible 
patterns68 of “‘particularly uncharacteristic misconduct following deploy-
ment’”:69  “Typical offenses [which can often be traced] directly from com-
bat PTSD” among veterans of Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan wars include 
“AWOL or desertion after return to [the] U.S., [u]se of illicit drugs to self-
medicate symptoms of PTSD, [and] [i]mpulsive assaults during explosive 
  
of international researchers highlighted continuing difficulties establishing the simplest con-
nections between mental illness and military members’ criminality James Taylor et al., Mili-
tary Veterans with Mental Health Problems: A Protocol for a Systematic Review to Identify 
Whether They Have an Additional Risk of Contact with the Criminal Justice Systems Com-
pared With Other Veteran Groups, 53 SYSTEMATIC REVS. 1 (2012). 
 65. See Michael D’Antonio, The War They Can’t Escape:  They Returned from the Un-
popular War in Vietnam to a Hostile Welcome; Often Very Young, Lacking Training in Jobs, 
and Haunted by the Traumas of Faraway War, Many Veterans Have Replaced the Jungles of 
Asia with New Ones⎯The Jungles of American Prisons, BOS. GLOBE, May 10, 1981, at 1. 
 66. See Daniel Burgess et al., Reviving the “Vietnam Defense”:  Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder and Criminal Responsibility in a Post-Iraq/Afghanistan World, 29 DEV. MENTAL 
HEALTH L. 59, 79 (2010).  But see United States v. Perry, No. 4:CR94–3035, 1995 WL 
137294, at *8 (D. Neb. Mar. 27, 1995) (finding a causal relationship between PTSD and “dis-
tribution of cocaine to fund the purchase of cocaine so as to be able to continue to self-
medicate”). 
 67. See TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 50, at 22 (“The time 
of onset, severity and duration of [PTSD-related] behaviors vary significantly from patient to 
patient.”). 
 68. Carpenter, supra note 40.  Most recently, Dr. Eric Elbogen and his colleagues have 
concluded that “combat trauma in the form of PTSD, combined with the high irritability that 
PTSD can cause, does ‘significantly’ raise the risk of criminal arrest.”  David Wood, Combat 
Veterans with PTSD, Anger Issues More Likely to Commit Crimes:  New Report, HUFFPOST 
WORLD (Oct. 10, 2012 1:18 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/10/09/veterans-ptsd-
crim-report_n_1951338.html; see also Eric B. Elbogen et al., Criminal Justice Involvement, 
Trauma, and Negative Affect in Iraq and Afghanistan War Era Veterans, 80 J. CONSULTING & 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 1097, 1099 (2012) (the link between combat exposure and arrest was 
mediated by PTSD with high irritability). 
 69. Zoroya, Battle Stress, supra note 43. 
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rages on officers or NCOs after return to the U.S.”70  Additionally, even 
where the offense was not directly caused by PTSD, the condition indirectly 
led to the offense; that is, had the disorder never been caused by combat 
trauma, the veteran would not find herself in the perfect storm of handicaps 
that preceded the offending behavior.71  This is why courts distinguish be-
tween PTSD on the merits as a substantive defense and PTSD as a mitigating 
or extenuating factor at sentencing, which might help to explain the miscon-
duct by putting it in the proper context.72  In addressing this justification for 
the Military Misconduct Catch-22, we must be careful not to rule out the 
value and propriety of treatment as a sentencing consideration in courts and 
boards, even where the misconduct is not directly attributable to the mental 
condition. 
2. In an All-Volunteer Military, the Servicemember Has Assumed the Risk 
That He or She May Be Traumatized by Combat.  Accordingly, He or She 
Should Ask for Help When Needed Rather than Acting Irresponsibly or En-
gaging in Behavior That Has Criminal Consequences. 
As Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) psychiatrist Jonathan Shay ob-
serves, “[t]he usual perception is that . . . these groups have only themselves 
to blame—it is their misconduct or criminal behavior that has deprived them 
of their benefits.”73  I have often heard this assumption of risk argument from 
  
 70. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 115. 
 71. See Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
21. 
 72. See, e.g., Burgess et al., supra note 66, at 79; Pinals, supra note 7, at 165 (noting 
psychiatrists’ position that “the impact of [PTSD] is sufficiently mitigating to avoid a potential 
death penalty sentence”); Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, 
supra note 5, at 144–47 (discussing courts’ consideration of PTSD symptoms as a mitigating 
factor at sentencing). 
 73. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 112.  Consider the prosecutor’s representative 
argument to the military panel in United States Air Force Court of Military Review v. Win-
chester: 
You should discharge the accused.  You can do that by sentencing him to a bad-conduct dis-
charge.  As to the accused’s statement that a bad-conduct discharge will mark him for life, 
well, if that’s true, he’s the one who set the stage to be so marked.  Furthermore, ask yourself, 
if he doesn’t get the bad-conduct discharge from you, does he deserve to get the same dis-
charge you will get after serving your country honorably?  No. 
U.S. Air Force Court of Military Review v. Winchester, No. ACM S28735, 1994 WL 481709, 
at *1 (A.F.C.M.R. Aug. 12, 1994) (emphasis omitted).  Military prosecutors have used similar 
arguments to target VA benefits, specifically during the punishment phase.  See, e.g., Supple-
ment to Petition for Grant of Review at 9, United States v. Connolly, No. 07-0184 (C.A.A.F. 
Jan. 26, 2007) (“How many soldiers deployed to Iraq, went to war, came back, and they didn’t 
drink and drive?  They didn’t run over two security guards.  These are the soldiers that de-
serve VA benefits, not the accused.”); Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Mili-
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fellow military attorneys.  However, the position fails to explain or account 
for all of the conscripted Vietnam veterans with PTSD who were punished 
instead of treated when the military was not an all-volunteer institution.74 
Likewise, it presumes that individuals who are prone to suffering from 
distorted and irrational thoughts are still able to determine what is in their 
best interests, despite the disorder.75  That is quite a tall order, considering 
how PTSD shatters the important assumption that “a moral order exists in the 
universe that discriminates right from wrong.”76  Senior Navy psychiatrist, 
Captain William Nash, for example, highlighted “combat stress’ potential to 
damage beliefs in right and wrong, self-identity and moral code.  Combat 
stress can damage brain centers that control emotions, impair rational 
thought circuits and inhibit a Marine’s ability to think before acting, putting 
leathernecks with combat experience at ‘increased risk’ of misconduct.”77  
Doctor Shay observes a related, widespread dubious belief among even psy-
chiatrists that good character, shaped over years of one’s upbringing, will 
endure through the worst trauma:  “[I]f bad experience leads someone who 
was good to do terrible things, it must be because he was secretly flawed 
from the beginning.  He deserves no respect for any previously honorable 
conduct—all possibility of respect or consideration has been obliterated by 
  
tary Justice, supra note 5, at 130–31 (discussing the prosecutor’s sentencing argument for a 
punitive discharge for Staff Sergeant Ryan Miller, who suffered from diagnosed service-
connected PTSD).  During Vietnam, the Army showed recruits a film titled The Smart Way 
Out, contrasting the military service and future experiences of “Good Joe” and “AWOL John-
ny.”  BASKIR & STRAUSS, supra note 38, at 121.  While Good Joe’s obedient service ended 
with “‘years of happiness’” based on his Honorable Discharge, Johnny’s future was filled with 
“‘bitterness, loneliness, and poverty’” as a result of Johnny’s absence from his unit.  Id.  The 
film concluded with Johnny’s arrest for vagrancy after he received an UD and turned to sub-
stance abuse.  Id.  The film, in addition to the prosecutors’ positions, reveals how the military 
has relished in the creation of future societal offenders for the sake of punishment and deter-
rence. 
 74. See RAYMOND MONSOUR SCURFIELD, A VIETNAM TRILOGY:  VETERANS AND POST 
TRAUMATIC STRESS:  1968, 1989, 2000, at 34 (2004) (observing how, during Vietnam, com-
manders deemed “almost all soldiers with emotional and psychiatric symptoms to be behav-
ioral problems” and subsequently responded with discipline). 
 75. Seamone, Attorneys as First-Responders, supra note 9, at 174 fig.2, 175 (identifying 
“eight forms of distorted thinking” that affect troops with PTSD). 
 76. William P. Nash, Combat/Operational Stress Adaptations and Injuries, in COMBAT 
STRESS INJURY:  THEORY, RESEARCH, AND MANAGEMENT 33, 53 (Charles R. Figley & William 
P. Nash eds., 2007).  Too often in combat, troops “are constantly confronted with stark evi-
dence that none of the basic assumptions upon which their mental stability is premised are 
valid.”  GABRIEL, supra note 14, at 83. 
 77. Hoellwarth, supra note 64. 
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his criminal act.”78  Shay argues that this notion of immutable character is 
flawed because “[p]rolonged combat can produce not only psychiatric symp-
toms, it can damage good character. . . . When bereavement, betrayal of 
what’s right, and horror have been sufficiently severe, even the noblest char-
acter may crack.”79 
In one respect, however, troops do have some control over their symp-
toms.80  Many servicemembers, due to stigmas against reporting mental 
health troubles,81 engage in the phenomenon of “reverse malingering” or 
“dissimulation,” in which they fake good, perhaps minimizing their respons-
es to routine post-deployment assessments in order to stay in service, thereby 
inviting aggravated conditions.82  With a steady campaign to make 
servicemembers aware of counseling options, and very public efforts to de-
stigmatize requests for help,83 some may claim that the servicemember is not 
totally absolved of the responsibility to seek treatment when she or he detects 
that something is just not right.  It still seems counterproductive, however, to 
deny them effective treatment on the basis of their symptoms, even in this 
instance. 
  
 78. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 113.  See also Jeremy Schwartz, ‘Bad Paper’ 
Discharges Can Stymie Veterans’ Health Care, STATESMAN.COM (Oct. 2, 2010, 10:48 PM), 
http://www.statesman.com/news/news/state-regional-govt-politics/bad-paper-discharges-can-
stymie-veterans-health--1/nRyPr/ (citing veterans’ advocate and attorney Teresa Panepinto for 
the proposition that single incidents of misconduct by combat-traumatized servicemembers 
often lead to stigmatizing discharges under zero tolerance policies, as if “‘[a]ll of a sudden, all 
the prior honorable service is negated’”). 
 79. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 112–13. 
 80. See Stephanie Hodson et al., Postdeployment Predictors of Traumatic Stress:  Rwan-
da, a Case Study, in MILITARY STRESS AND PERFORMANCE:  THE AUSTRALIAN DEFENCE FORCE 
EXPERIENCE 151, 159 (George E. Kearney et al. eds., 2003) (“[M]ilitary personnel expect to 
be exposed to potentially traumatic events, making these experiences more predictable and 
potentially more manageable.”). 
 81. Tracy Stecker & John Fortney, Barriers to Mental Health Treatment Engagement 
Among Veterans, in CARING FOR VETERANS WITH DEPLOYMENT-RELATED STRESS DISORDERS:  
IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND BEYOND 243, 245–46 (Josef I. Ruzek et al. eds., 2011) (describing 
various “barriers to mental health treatment”). 
 82. See Frank C. Budd & Sally Harvey, Military Fitness-for-Duty Evaluations, in 
MILITARY PSYCHOLOGY:  CLINICAL AND OPERATIONAL APPLICATIONS 35, 49 (Carrie H. Ken-
nedy & Erica A. Zillmer eds., 2006).  The authors are keen to point out how, “[i]n such cases, 
the individual should not receive a diagnosis of malingering but instead should receive the 
appropriate diagnosis (e.g., depression or substance abuse).”  Id. 
 83. Stecker & Fortney, supra note 81, at 251–53. 
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3. The Diagnosis of PTSD Is the Easiest to Fake and There Is Really No 
Way to Tell Whether It Is Legitimate in a Given Case.  The Military Must 
Therefore Take a Hardline Approach to Misconduct Without Exception Be-
cause Alternatives to Punishment Would Reward Offenders Who Pretend to 
Be Afflicted by the Disorder for Secondary Gain. 
An experienced VA psychiatrist “almost always” encounters two posi-
tions most frequently when discussing veterans with mental health conditions 
who are barred from receiving benefits:  “‘The Biggest Liar I Ever Met’ sto-
ry or ‘Doc, you been had by a scammer.’”84  In both the civilian and military 
context, we can expect concern over a diagnosis that depends entirely on the 
self-reported symptoms of a patient.85  When anyone can read up on the In-
ternet and memorize a script to increase their chances of a PTSD diagnosis, 
and that diagnosis can maximize his or her potential for unique forms of sec-
ondary gain in the military—whether it is to evade deployment, combat, or a 
work detail in general—military psychiatrists agree that they must necessari-
ly be cautious in their evaluations.86 
Here too, however, generalization ignores the legitimate experiences of 
PTSD sufferers.  While healthy skepticism may help identify cases of falsifi-
cation, an accusing eye can exacerbate the symptoms and worsen the condi-
tion of those who legitimately suffer from the disorder.87  This lesson is most 
clear in facilitating the mental health treatment of alleged rape victims.  Alt-
hough it is quite possible that some rape accusers have motives to falsify 
their allegations,88 the criminal justice system rightfully rejects the antiquat-
ed, discriminatory model that would cast doubt on all accusers before treat-
  
 84. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 113. 
 85. See Robert H. Aronson et al., Attorney-Client Confidentiality and the Assessment of 
Claimants Who Allege Posttraumatic Stress Disorder, 76 WASH. L. REV. 313, 335 (2001) 
(“Individuals can malinger PTSD symptoms on their own, with the assistance of relevant 
reading materials, or with the benefit of coaching by relatives, friends, or counsel.”). 
 86. See Budd & Harvey, supra note 82, at 35, 48–49. 
 87. See id. at 48–49. 
 88. See, e.g., Robert R. Hazelwood & Ann Wolbert Burgess, False Rape Allegations, in 
PRACTICAL ASPECTS OF RAPE INVESTIGATION:  A MULTIDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 181, 193–94 
(Robert R. Hazelwood & Ann Wolbert Burgess eds., 4th ed. 2009) (providing other specific 
examples of motive in falsely reported rapes); JOHN M. MACDONALD, RAPE:  CONTROVERSIAL 
ISSUES:  CRIMINAL PROFILES, DATE RAPE, FALSE REPORTS AND FALSE MEMORIES 87 (1995) 
(discussing “many motives for false reports of rape,” which usually fall within the distinct 
categories of alibi, revenge or payback, financial or other gain, and attention or sympathy); 
Aviva Orenstein, Presuming Guilt or Protecting Victims?:  Analyzing the Special Treatment 
of Those Accused of Rape, in RACE TO INJUSTICE:  LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE DUKE 
LACROSSE RAPE CASE 351, 351 (Michael L. Seigel ed., 2009) (“No one can or should claim 
that women never lie or are never mistaken about rape.”). 
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ing their complaints as legitimate.89  Even if there is potential that the allega-
tion is fabricated, it does too much damage to victims that have actually ex-
perienced sexual violation to support such a skeptical model; most rapes go 
unreported due to the stigma of skepticism.90  For public health reasons, the 
well-being of legitimate sexual assault victims rightfully requires suspension 
of such skepticism in favor of prompt intervention that maximizes the well-
being of society at large.91  The resulting investigatory and prosecutorial pol-
icies seeking restraint in the rush to invalidate represent a necessary “delicate 
balance” in which “[t]he rules and procedures must be formulated with both 
the sexually brutalized victim and the absolutely innocent accused in 
mind.”92 
We can learn much from the policy lessons surrounding allegations of 
sexual assault, which often result in PTSD.  Recognizing the fact that many 
civilian abuses of the PTSD diagnosis have unfairly caused critics to doubt 
the complaints of military members,93 the desire to eradicate common obsta-
cles to PTSD treatment counters this prevalent justification for the Military 
Misconduct Catch-22.94  No one who legitimately cares about the effective 
treatment of PTSD victims, whether they are criminals or the greatest of Sa-
  
 89. See MARIA BEVACQUA, RAPE ON THE PUBLIC AGENDA:  FEMINISM AND THE POLITICS 
OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 58–59 fig.1.1, 100–01 (2000) (challenging well-worn “rape myths” that 
all complaining “[w]omen make false allegations of rape out of revenge or spite”).  The myth, 
which represents a “cognitive distortion[],” has actually dominated the criminal justice system 
until very recent times, when legislators began to develop evidentiary rules that would limit 
the humiliation suffered by rape victims.  JOANNA BOURKE, RAPE:  SEX, VIOLENCE, HISTORY 
23 (2007); Betsy Wright Kreisel, Police and Victims of Sexual Assault, in SEXUAL ASSAULT:  
THE VICTIMS, THE PERPETRATORS, AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 337, 346, 376–78 
(Frances P. Reddington & Betsy Wright Kreisel eds., 2d ed. 2009); see also Hazelwood & 
Burgess, supra note 88, at 194.  In early days of the legal system, and whenever invoked by 
the defense in the current one, the myth has the effect of contributing to an attack on victims 
that can rightfully be labeled a “second rape.”  LEE MADIGAN & NANCY C. GAMBLE, THE 
SECOND RAPE:  SOCIETY’S CONTINUED BETRAYAL OF THE VICTIM 3 (1991); Jeffrey W. Spears, 
Prosecution of Sex Crimes, in SEXUAL ASSAULT:  THE VICTIMS, THE PERPETRATORS, AND THE 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 365, 376 (Frances P. Reddington & Betsy Wright Kreisel eds., 2d 
ed. 2009). 
 90. See MADIGAN & GAMBLE, supra note 86, at 3; Hazelwood & Burgess, supra note 85, 
at 181. 
 91. Kreisel, supra note 89, at 346 (“For the benefit of the victim’s emotional state and the 
betterment of case processing, law enforcement should be advised to approach every allega-
tion of sexual assault as truthful until there is solid evidence to prove otherwise.”) (emphasis 
added).  Some adopt an even stricter standard than solid evidence:  “‘Only when your doubts 
overwhelm the evidence supporting the complaint should you begin to consider the possibility 
of a false allegation.’”  Hazelwood & Burgess, supra note 89, at 193–94. 
 92. Orenstein, supra note 88, at 352. 
 93. SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 204. 
 94. See discussion infra Part III. 
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maritans, should automatically challenge the troops who seek PTSD treat-
ment following misconduct.  Just as it is possible to pursue a false accuser 
with perjury charges, the legal system has the ability to incorporate sanctions 
into treatment programs for offenders who do not comply with treatment 
plans in the criminal context, eliminating the idea that a malingerer might get 
off too easy if the system responded by according automatic legitimacy to 
reported symptoms.95  In any probationary/diversionary arrangement, the 
sentencing or prosecuting authority retains the ability to institute the sus-
pended punishment or institute the deferred charges based on material 
breaches of the underlying agreement.96 
4. The Military Simply is Not the Type of Organization That Can or Does 
Invest in the Intensive Rehabilitation of Offenders.  If It Did, This Might 
Prioritize Efforts to Assist Lawbreakers Who Have Dishonored Themselves 
Ahead, or in Lieu, of Those Combat-Traumatized Warriors who Served 
Honorably. 
I include this position because I have heard it so often from fellow at-
torneys.  Normally, it arises in the context of clemency when troops request 
that commanders depart from the sentence handed down by a military judge 
or military panel as an act of mercy.97  Based on reported figures, there is a 
perception that military commanders do not often exercise any type of clem-
ency, despite their practically unlimited discretion to disapprove or modify 
any aspect of an adjudged sentence.98  If, say the commentators, clemency 
was once exercised for the purpose of rehabilitating offenders, advances in 
modern warfare have made the individual less important to military success, 
and hence, less important to salvage for the service.99  As it relates to offend-
ers with mental illness, this position relies as much on the notion that rehabil-
itation is dead in the military as it does on the belief that rehabilitation is 
  
 95. See James L. Nolan, Jr., Redefining Criminal Courts:  Problem-Solving and the 
Meaning of Justice, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1541, 1555 (2003) (describing how noncompliance 
with treatment plans in a veterans or mental health treatment court “may result in more serious 
sanctions than would be experienced in a traditional . . . court”). 
 96. See Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
170 (“[T]he ability to vacate a suspension for failure to meet the terms of a suspended sen-
tence preserves the option of executing the adjudged punishment.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Michael J. Marinello, Convening Authority Clemency:  Is It Really an Ac-
cused’s Best Chance of Relief?, 54 NAVAL L. REV. 169, 169 (2007) (describing the command-
er’s discretion to modify a sentence to the accused’s benefit for nearly any reason). 
 98. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
14–15 n.35. 
 99. See id. at 14, 43 n.145. 
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valued only to the extent that it can repair the warrior for a return to the front 
lines, benefitting the institution over the individual.100 
While commanders and attorneys have the freedom to adopt these 
views, it is vital to recognize that they do not represent the actual state of 
rehabilitative efforts in the military justice system.  Not only do various pro-
visions of military law explicitly direct that military judges and juries con-
sider rehabilitative potential to a greater degree than civilian courts,101 but 
panel members, judges, and commanders often attempt to suspend sentences 
specifically when the offender suffers from a mental health condition.102  
Elsewhere, I have pointed to a line of historical and continued precedents, 
which collectively demonstrate a viable rehabilitative ethic imprinted “in the 
very DNA of the military justice system,” if only commanders and attorneys 
are willing to look for and appreciate proof of this ethic’s existence.103  
Throughout major wars, this ethic further offered second chances to offend-
ers,104 even when they were not capable of rejoining the force due to their 
condition.105  In such cases, the military recognized society’s need for a pro-
ductive citizen rather than a socially-stigmatized castaway with few opportu-
nities for social advancement.106 
Almost all of the above rationales for the Military Misconduct Catch-
22107 are tied in some way to the special mission of the military and the dan-
ger of losing the ability to react with superior force anywhere and anytime.108  
The unifying thread is clearly the need to protect society, which routinely 
justifies troops’ loss of privileges enjoyed by civilians who rely on the mili-
tary to protect their sacred way of life.109  However, the important and distin-
  
 100. See id. at 43 n.145; see also SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 47.  Justice Schaller suggests 
that military psychiatry is slanted to support this view:  “Preparing soldiers to return to the 
battlefield is one of the controversial purposes of military psychiatry in the case of traumatic 
stress disorders.”  SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 47. 
 101. MCM, supra note 34, at II-123. 
 102. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
125, 127, 131–32. 
 103. Id. at 15, 123, 184. 
 104. See, e.g., id. at 47, 59–61, 73. 
 105. Id. at 62. 
 106. See id. at 78 & n.284 (discussing principal objectives to avoid future damage to so-
ciety as a result of military discharges). 
 107. Picard, supra note 41. 
 108. See Marinello, supra note 97, at 171–73. 
 109. See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974) (“The fundamental necessity [of] obe-
dience and the consequent necessity for imposition of discipline, may render permissible 
within the military that which would be constitutionally impermissible outside it.”); Orloff v. 
Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 92 (1953) (“[T]he very essence of [military] service is the suborna-
tion of the desires and interests of the individual to the needs of the service”); In re Grimley, 
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guishing question answered in this article is:  What happens when, by virtue 
of untreated mental conditions, the military’s disciplinary system is breeding 
recidivism and placing society at a far greater cumulative risk?  In other 
words, can the military’s insistence on just deserts punishments and willful 
ignorance of legitimate and continuing mental health care needs justify its 
creation of a class of future offenders who will return to their own communi-
ties—well within the boundaries of our cities, towns, and neighborhoods—
and wreak havoc on innocent bystanders and their own families, as they ad-
vance toward their demise?  No must be the only acceptable answer.110 
III. CONTOURS OF “THE MILITARY MISCONDUCT CATCH-22” 
Although the premium on military discipline creates many terrible iro-
nies,111 the Military Misconduct Catch-22 concerns a very specific dilem-
ma.112  Concisely stated by Attorney Carissa Picard: 
What’s the point of DoD recognizing that PTSD/TBI causes mis-
conduct when it doesn’t do anything to stop [the] “pattern of mis-
conduct” discharges for soldiers with PTSD/TBI?  How can it say 
[that] this is evidence of a service-related disability only to use this 
evidence to deny servicemembers access to benefits for that disa-
bility?113 
  
137 U.S. 147, 152 (1890) (“By enlistment the citizen becomes a soldier.  His relations to the 
[s]tate and the public are changed.”); James Finn, The Two Societies, in CONSCIENCE AND 
COMMAND:  JUSTICE AND DISCIPLINE IN THE MILITARY 3, 5 (James Finn ed., 1979) (“Support 
for the military institution and its ability to defend society must take priority even if it requires 
some restrictions on those rights normally possessed by the citizens.”). 
 110. See SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 209 (“It is unconscionable when . . . military leaders 
fail to take measures that prevent veterans with PTSD from lapsing into criminal behavior in 
the first place.”). 
 111. Stopping Suicides:  Mental Health Challenges Within the U.S. Department of Veter-
ans Affairs:  Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 110th Cong. 93, 96–98 
(2007) (statement of Joy J. Ilem, Assistant National Legislative Director, Disabled American 
Veterans) [hereinafter Ilem Testimony].  As only one example, individuals who have fought in 
distant lands “to restore the freedoms of the Iraqi and Afghani peoples” often return to lose 
not only their sanity, but also “their own personal freedom after returning home,” confined for 
the criminal symptoms of their mental conditions.  Id. at 97. 
 112. Picard, supra note 41. 
 113. Id.; see also Gregg Zoroya, Troubled Troops in No-Win Plight; Marines Kicked Out 
for Conduct Linked to Stress Disorder Are Often Denied Treatment by the V.A., USA TODAY, 
Nov. 2, 2006, at A1 [hereinafter Zoroya, Troubled Troops] (discussing Marine Lieutenant 
Colonel Colby Vokey’s description of an identical Catch-22). 
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This dilemma deals not only with the military’s insulated activities in admin-
istering discipline, but, more importantly, the military’s act of passing on its 
discarded troops to civilian society with severe handicaps related to their 
discharge characterizations that prevent successful reintegration.114 
While military discharges come in many forms, four types often totally 
preclude the veteran from receiving practically all pension, health care, and 
other benefits from governmental organizations:  The UD, the OTH, the 
BCD, and the DD.115  This article is not concerned with the DD because it is 
reserved for the most egregious offenses and automatically precludes bene-
fits from the VA.116  Nor is this article concerned with the General Under 
Honorable Conditions Discharge.  While many consider a General Under 
Honorable Conditions Discharge to be stigmatizing because it is not fully 
Honorable, it precludes educational benefits under the GI Bill, and it sug-
gests substandard performance,117 this general characterization still permits a 
veteran to maintain veteran status and obtain the most vital benefits from the 
VA.118  Undoubtedly, the ability to retain VA health care benefits is critical 
to the PTSD- and OSI-afflicted combat veterans’ reintegration, because the 
VA is “[t]he only reservoir of combat PTSD expertise,” completely un-
matched by the “overburdened state mental hospitals and municipal general 
hospitals” to which most veterans with crippling discharges must turn.119 
  
 114. See, e.g., BASKIR & STRAUSS, supra note 38, at 160 (observing how “the [UD] has led 
many a veteran into a hopeless downward spiral”). 
 115. See VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS COMM’N, HONORING THE CALL TO DUTY:  
VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 90–92 (2007), available at 
http://veterans.senate.gov/upload/VetDisBenefitComm9-27.pdf. 
 116. See id. at 90; see also 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2006).  Not only does a DD bar benefits 
under 38 U.S.C. § 101(2), but any punitive discharge from a general court-martial, including a 
BCD, also bars benefits.  Id. § 5303(a). 
 117. See, e.g., Christopher H. Lunding, Judicial Review of Military Administrative Dis-
charges, 83 YALE L.J. 33, 34–35 (1973) (“Courts have found the General Discharge to consti-
tute ‘a stigma of tremendous impact which [has] a lifelong effect.’”) (alteration in original) 
(citing, as an example, Unglesby v. Zimny, 250 F. Supp. 714, 717 (N.D. Cal. 1965)); Charles 
P. Sandel, Comment, Other-than-Honorable Military Administrative Discharges:  Time for 
Confrontation, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 839, 849 (1984) (“[E]arly separation itself stigmatizes a 
servicemember.  Derogatory characterization is an added stigma.”). 
 118. Marshall L. Wilde, Incomplete Justice:  Unintended Consequences of Military 
Nonjudicial Punishment, 60 A.F. L. REV. 115, 139 (2007) (“A discharge with a general service 
characterization permits the servicemember to retain most of his VA benefits . . . .”); see 
Douglass L. Custis, Due Process and Military Discharges, 57 A.B.A. J. 875, 875 n.4 (1971) 
(finding “a distinction without a difference” between the Honorable Discharge and the Gen-
eral Under Honorable Conditions Discharge). 
 119. Health Care, Economic Opportunities and Social Services for Veterans and Their 
Dependents—A Community Perspective:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight & In-
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Many servicemembers believe that they are automatically ineligible for 
VA benefits upon discharge with a BCD, OTH, or UD characterization.120  
While some may, in fact, be barred, VA adjudicators must make an inde-
pendent determination on a case-by-case basis regarding whether a particular 
troop’s service was honorable enough to receive benefits.121  The major prob-
lem with this character of service process is, as judges of the Court of Ap-
peals for Veterans’ Claims have recognized, the “murky statutory and regula-
tory framework” guiding these determinations.122  Within this framework, the 
VA uses its own definitions related to military misconduct rather than the 
military’s definitions.123  Hence, VA adjudicators use standards like crimes 
of “moral turpitude” and “willful and persistent misconduct” to determine 
whether a servicemember’s conduct was other than dishonorable.124 
Problematically, VA adjudicators have little guidance on the meanings 
of their own terms and consequently apply subjective determinations to justi-
fy their decisions.125  Simplification of these provisions is more difficult be-
  
vestigations of the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 103d Cong. 105 (1993) (testimony of War-
ren Quinlan) [hereinafter Quinlan Testimony]. 
 120. See PAUL STARR WITH RAYMOND P. BONNER, THE DISCARDED ARMY:  VETERANS 
AFTER VIETNAM 179–80 (1974). 
 121. See To Amend Title 10, United States Code, to Limit the Separation of Members of 
the Armed Forces Under Conditions Other than Honorable, and for Other Purposes:  Hear-
ings on H.R. 523 Before the Subcomm. No. 3 of the H. Comm. on Armed Servs., 92d Cong. 
6008 (1971) [hereinafter Hearings on H.R. 523] (observing that it would be “illegal” for the 
VA to grant benefits to the recipient of a UD, OTH, or BCD without conducting a case-by-
case analysis). 
 122. Trilles v. West, 13 Vet. App. 314, 330 (2000) (Kramer, J., & Steinberg, J., concur-
ring) (citing 38 U.S.C. § 5303(a)–(b) (2006); Butler v. West, 12 Vet. App. 7, 8 (1998) (per 
curiam) (Kramer, J., concurring); 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(b)–(c) (2012)). 
 123. See, e.g., Samuel W. Morris, A Survey of Military Retirement Benefits, 177 MIL. L. 
REV. 133, 139–40 (2003) (“The term ‘under conditions other than dishonorable’ poses a prob-
lem for [military attorneys] because this statutory definition is different from the language the 
military uses to characterize its discharges.”). 
 124. 38 C.F.R. § 3.12(d)(3) (2012) (barring benefits for crimes of “moral turpitude,” 
which generally include felonies); id. § 3.12(d)(4) (barring benefits for “willful and persistent 
misconduct,” unless the offense was minor in nature and the offender’s “service was other-
wise honest, faithful, and meritorious”).  Even in the 1950s, attorneys who studied these terms 
found problems with their application by the VA that resulted in the inability “to lay down any 
hard and fast rules” about how the circumstances of a given discharge would be interpreted by 
adjudicators under these guidelines.  See W.C. Blake, Punishment Aspects of a Bad Conduct 
Discharge, JAG J., Dec. 1952, at 5, 22.  For an expansive discussion of these standards, see 
Brooker et al., supra note 47, at 160-201. 
 125. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 523, supra note 121, at 5862 (statement of Representative 
Richard C. White raising concerns that VA adjudicators could realistically label “persistent 
jaywalking” as a basis to deny benefits under the VA’s standard for willful and persistent 
misconduct); id. at 6009 (statement of Philip V. Warman, Associate General Counsel, VA 
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cause lawyers, military commanders, judges, and even policymakers at the 
highest levels of the discharge characterization process have little under-
standing of the administrative rules that guide the VA in conducting the case-
by-case analysis.126  These problems are quite significant because a 
servicemember is not considered a “veteran” under all of the benefits statutes 
if the VA determines that his or her UD, OTH, or BCD—crippling discharg-
es—was issued for service “under conditions other than dishonorable.”127  
The consequence of this threshold determination means that a veteran suffer-
ing from PTSD will have to wait until the VA adjudicator makes the charac-
ter of service determination, if that determination is favorable, before obtain-
ing VA benefits and comprehensive mental health treatment.128 
It is impossible to estimate how many veterans are denied benefits 
through the VA’s Character of Service process because even the VA does 
not track these figures.129  Notably, discarded veterans with crippling dis-
  
confirming the subjective and non-uniform analyses of VA adjudicators in different offices); 
Donald J. Brown, The Results of the Punitive Discharge, 15 JAG J. 13, 14 (1961) (“The phrase 
‘moral turpitude or willful and persistent misconduct’ is sufficiently indefinite that its applica-
tion may vary among the different [VA] field activities and adjudication units.”). 
 126. See, e.g., U.S. Air Force Court of Military Review v. Winchester, No. ACM 528735, 
1994 WL 481709, at *3 (A.F.C.M.R. Aug. 12, 1994) (finding that the trial court provided 
erroneous instructions about the VA’s standards for evaluating BCDs); United States v. Ball-
inger, 13 C.M.R. 465, 467 (A.B.R. 1953) (finding error in the trial judge’s misstatements to 
the panel members about the VA’s character of service determination process); Bradley K. 
Jones, The Gravity of Administrative Discharges:  A Legal and Empirical Evaluation, 59 MIL. 
L. REV. 1, 16 (1973) (“Much of the commentary regarding the effect of the administrative 
discharge is based on sheer speculation.”).  “The consequences of the general and undesirable 
discharges are . . . little understood by the JAG officers asked to ‘counsel’ the recipients.”  
Jones, supra, at 1.  At a congressional hearing in 1971, Major General Leo Benade, a senior 
policymaker charged with the establishment of adverse discharge procedures, explained he 
“couldn’t describe . . . what the internal procedures of the VA are,” and reasoned, “[h]opefully 
the [VA] would utilize the same standards in evaluating [different cases involving UDs] and 
reach the same decision if the pattern of conduct is the same.”  Hearings on H.R. 523, supra 
note 121, at 5861 (statement of Major General Leo E. Benade, Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Military Personnel Policy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Man-
power and Reserve Affairs).  He explained that his lack of knowledge about their process 
resulted from the fact that “[t]he [DoD] is not consulted [by the VA] in these cases.”  Id. 
 127. See 38 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2006). 
 128.   Brooker et al., supra note 47, at 40-41 (providing an example of how a former 
servicemember can be denied benefits pending review of his status at the moment he sought 
outpatient medical care from a VA facility). 
 129. Id. at 157-58; see also Hal Bernton, Troubled Veterans Left Without Health-Care 
Benefits, SEATTLE TIMES (Aug. 11, 2012, 8:03PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/ 
localnews/2018894574_vets12m.html [hereinafter Bernton, Troubled Veterans Left Without 
Health-Care Benefits] (“[T]he [VA] has no way to track how many [Character of Service] 
reviews are conducted, how long they take, or their outcomes.”). 
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charges have many disincentives to even apply for benefits after the labeling 
experience following their other punishments.130  As one such two-time Iraq 
veteran with PTSD and an OTH separation for “‘pattern[s] of misconduct’” 
explained, “‘I have nothing . . . .  After all I did for the Army, they took my 
money and kicked me to the curb and said, “Don’t let the door hit you in the 
ass.”’”131  Months, often years, without care before a final decision is ren-
dered on a former troop’s status is the greatest of all impediments.132  All too 
often, this “lost legion of ‘bad-paper vet[erans]’” evaporates into an invisible 
status with no mandates for any agency to care for their existence and great 
shame whenever they reveal the manner in which they left the military.133 
Sadly, the greatest effort to assist ex-servicemembers in upgrading their 
discharges came—and went—in the early 1980s, as Vietnam veterans ap-
proached the delimiting date in which they would no longer be eligible for 
educational benefits unless they obtained fully honorable discharges.134  
Once that delimiting date passed, the impetus to assist bad paper veterans 
fizzled, replaced by a preference to prioritize services for honorably dis-
charged veterans who never committed misconduct in the first place.135  Of 
  
 130. See Bernton, Troubled Veterans Left Without Health-Care Benefits, supra note 129; 
Kennedy, supra note 53. 
 131. Kennedy, supra note 53. 
 132. See, e.g., Letter from Manuel Duran, Exec. Dir., & Sean W. Mullaney, President, 
Shelter Legal Servs. Found., Inc., to President William J. Clinton (Apr. 30, 1993), in Health 
Care, Economic Opportunities, and Social Services for Veterans and Their Dependents—A 
Community Perspective:  Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations of 
the H. Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 103d Cong. 106, 106 (1993) (observing how “[t]ime in 
effect discriminates” against the veteran who applies for benefits, especially when she or he is 
homeless and transient); see also STARR WITH BONNER, supra note 120, at 175 (“Men are 
discouraged from appealing because the process usually takes years and requires legal assis-
tance beyond their means.”). 
 133. Lee May, Finally Is Given Honorable Status but Can’t Collect Damages:  WWII GI 
Still Battling over ‘Bad’ Discharge, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1986, at 13 (describing the plight of 
a “lost legion of ‘bad-paper vets’”).  On the topic of shame, see, for example, Edgar May, 
Inmate Veterans:  Hidden Casualties of a Lost War, CORRECTIONS MAG., Mar. 1979, at 3, 4 
(“‘A guy who has got a ‘bad paper’ discharge is probably not going to volunteer that for you . 
. . .’”). 
 134. See Oversight on Issues Related to Incarcerated Veterans:  Hearing Before the S. 
Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, 96th Cong. 26 (1979) (testimony of James J. Cox, Director, 
Veterans Assistance Service, Veterans Administration) (“Each day, thousands of veterans 
reach their delimiting date . . . . [W]e are in a race against time, because . . . time is running 
out rapidly for Vietnam-era veterans to use their educational benefits.”). 
 135. See, e.g., Letter from Edward J. Derwinski, Sec’y of Veterans Affairs, to Honorable 
G.V. (Sonny) Montgomery, Chairman, Comm. on Veterans’ Affairs, House of Representa-
tives (Apr. 27, 1990), in Incarcerated Veterans Rehabilitation and Readjustment Act of 1989:  
Hearing on H.R. 3453 Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Intellectual Prop., & the Admin. of 
Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 88, 91 (1990), available at 
 
29
Seamone: Dismantling America's Largest Sleeper Cell: The Imperative to Tre
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
508 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
course, the notion of these discarded troops’ invisibility is illusory, as their 
numbers are revealed daily in homeless shelters, prisons, jails, and—very 
sadly—morgues throughout the nation.136 
The veterans’ service organizations that represent the small portion of 
ex-troops who do apply for Character of Discharge determinations have es-
timated general rates of success for such claims.137  The National Veterans 
Legal Services Project reports the VA’s approval rate at ten percent.138  A 
former supervisory benefits adjudicator and subject matter expert who 
worked in the Los Angeles VA Regional Office from 2002 to 2008 provides 
a more generous approval estimate of slightly under half of the applica-
tions.139  Anecdotally, we can also turn to the observations of one of the 
VA’s foremost PTSD experts who shared his experience with Congress:  
“[a]s a VA physician, I have never treated a veteran with a Bad-Conduct, 
Undesirable, or Dishonorable Discharge, because they cannot get through the 
front door—they are ineligible for any VA services.”140 
No matter the precise disapproval rate, it is clear that a substantial popu-
lation of veterans with crippling discharges remain closed-off to meaningful 
care.141  These statistics are quite important because they translate to a grow-
ing population of tens of thousands of traumatized combat veterans whose 
symptoms contributed to their jettison from the military and their inability to 
obtain quality medical care in civilian society.  For an idea of the size of this 
  
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/153232NCJRS.pdf (explaining that providing 
services for veterans who commit misconduct “presents a question of priorities” for “diverting 
staff” from activities designated for veterans who need resources and did not commit miscon-
duct). 
 136. Consider that “38% of veterans in [s]tate prison” “failed to receive an honorable 
discharge.”  NOONAN & MUMOLA, supra note 9, at 6.  Additionally, studies in more recent 
times have found that approximately 20% of veterans in state prisons and local jails are dis-
qualified from receiving VA benefits based on the nature of their crippling discharges.  James 
McGuire, Closing a Front Door to Homelessness Among Veterans, 28 J. PRIMARY 
PREVENTION 389, 390 (2007).  Within one New England homeless shelter for veterans, the 
director found 50% of the inhabitants had crippling discharges—when he looked for this 
variable specifically.  Quinlan Testimony, supra note 119, at 104 (“[O]n any given day, an 
average of about 50% of the men coming through the [shelter] doors . . . have . . . ‘bad paper.’  
Half, or 25% of these are combat veterans.”). 
 137. See, e.g., MICHAEL ETTLINGER & DAVID F. ADDLESTONE, MILITARY DISCHARGE 
UPGRADING AND INTRODUCTION TO VETERANS ADMINISTRATION LAW 26/2, 26/9 (1990 Supp.). 
 138. Id. (“The VA favorably adjudicates only about ten percent of these cases.”). 
 139. Brooker et al., supra note 47, at 157. 
 140. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 116. 
 141. See STARR WITH BONNER, supra note 120, at 179–80.  It would be a valuable task for 
scholars and VA employees to determine a general rate of success for initial applications and 
appeals; any established success rate might motivate applications from those many veterans 
who believe they are automatically ineligible. 
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population, through Vietnam, the military discharged 224,000 
servicemembers with UD characterizations and 31,800 with BCDs.142  Be-
tween October 2000 and September 2005 alone, 55,111 active duty 
servicemembers were separated with OTH discharges and 8,190 were sepa-
rated with BCDs.143  An investigative reporter for the Seattle Times con-
firmed that the military discarded over 20,000 more troops with OTH dis-
charges between 2008 and 2012.144  The collective number is likely to in-
crease, given the military’s objective to draw-down the forces by many more 
tens of thousands using involuntary separation as a major vehicle.145 
A commander of a large unit once lectured on the topic of command 
discretion.  He explained that many commanders liken the process of receiv-
ing—and then eliminating—a soldier to playing a hand of poker.  If a soldier 
turns out to be a deuce, then the commander can merely discard him and pull 
another card from an endless supply of recruits.  With no accountability for 
their discards, the process can go on indefinitely, and even well-intentioned 
commanders can remain blissfully ignorant regarding the outcome of their 
disciplinary decisions.146  As Chuck Luther, an attorney for Military Spouses 
for Change, observes, “‘[t]he military is creating a societal issue’ . . . .  ‘The-
se guys come out with no resources, and they’re angry and feeling betrayed.  
But commanders are thinking, “Do I rehabilitate him or do I get rid of him 
expeditiously so I can replace him with someone who can deploy?”’”147 
  
 142. BASKIR & STRAUSS, supra note 38, at 155 fig.6 (Military Punishments between Au-
gust 4, 1964 and March 28, 1973). 
 143. VETERANS’ DISABILITY BENEFITS COMM’N, supra note 115, at 93 tbl.5.1. 
 144. Bernton, Troubled Veterans Left Without Health-Care Benefits, supra note 129; see 
also Carpenter, supra note 40 (reporting statistics that the Army discharged 27,973 soldiers 
with stigmatizing discharge characterizations between October 2002 and May 2009, with 
12,700 alone, discharged in fiscal year 2003). 
 145. DAVID F. BURRELLI ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41874, FY2012 NATIONAL 
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT:  SELECTED MILITARY PERSONNEL POLICY ISSUES 3, 7 (2012) 
(“[T]he Secretary of Defense announced on January 6, 2011 that the Active Army would 
begin a reduction in its end strength by 22,000 in 2012.  This reduction would be followed by 
an additional reduction of 27,000 to begin in FY2015 and be completed in FY2016.”). 
 146. See Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
33 (describing how the military is oblivious to the fact that it has inflicted a “double wound” 
on military offenders with punitive discharges by placing them in the combat conditions that 
caused their injuries and then shutting them out of future treatment). 
 147. Kennedy, supra note 53; see also Sandel, supra note 117, at 855 (noting how com-
manders face unintentional incentives to quickly eliminate offending subordinates as to appear 
devoted to accomplishing the military mission and as not to “discredit [the] command”); TASK 
FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 48, at 22 (describing “instances in 
which returning [wounded warrior] service members were pressured by commanders and 
peers to accept . . . administrative discharge so they could be expeditiously cleared from the 
unit and replaced with a fully functional person”). 
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Although, for more than a generation, military lawyers,148 veterans’ ad-
vocates,149 legislators,150 VA psychiatry experts in PTSD,151 and senior men-
tal health professionals within the military152 have consistently raised con-
cerns over the Military Misconduct Catch-22, there has been no successful 
corrective action.153  In fact, the Marine Corps recently learned that 326 of 
the 1,019 Marines it had dismissed with less-than-honorable characteriza-
tions (in the first four years following the war in Iraq) had legitimate mental 
health care needs.154  Despite this knowledge, the Marine Corps made no 
effort to determine whether that population eventually obtained benefits.155 
To put this issue in proper perspective, it is vital to remember that many 
of the recent “invisible injuries” among troops originated from insurgent 
attacks on U.S. forces serving overseas.  When the injuries continue to mani-
fest in later, unexpected, violent, and often deadly episodes, untreated PTSD 
spares recruits to al Qaeda’s cause; the violence, disruption, and dread that 
results from PTSD has created a growing sleeper cell of veterans with un-
precedented access to our homeland.156  Sadly, despite the military’s best 
  
 148. See, e.g., Zoroya, Battle Stress, supra note 43; Zoroya, Troubled Troops, supra note 
113 (discussing Marine Lieutenant Colonel Colby Vokey’s criticism of the “no-win situation” 
that results from the Military Misconduct Catch-22). 
 149. See, e.g., Ilem Testimony, supra note 111, at 93, 98 (discussing Joy J. Ilem’s con-
cerns). 
 150. See, e.g., Hearings on H.R. 523, supra note 121, at 5825 (statement of Rep. Charles 
E. Bennett) (questioning the accuracy, consistency, reliability, and fairness of the VA’s char-
acter of service process and recommending determinations of benefits prior to the 
servicemember’s discharge to avoid the Military Misconduct Catch-22 throughout the hear-
ings). 
 151. See, e.g., Maxine Waters & Jonathan Shay, Heal the “Bad Paper” Veterans, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 30, 1994, at 1–19 (“Whatever the circumstances surrounding combat veterans’ 
bad-paper discharges, it is self-defeating to deny them benefits.  We don’t save money by 
shutting them out; it costs . . . much more [in various social and law enforcement services later 
in time].”). 
 152. See, e.g., TASK FORCE ON MENTAL HEALTH, DEP’T OF DEF., supra note 48, at 22 (rec-
ommending assessment of and treatment for PTSD prior to the discharge of servicemembers 
facing administrative discharge for misconduct).  In 2007, a Navy psychiatrist and combat 
stress expert warned, “[i]f a Marine who was previously a good, solid Marine—never got in 
trouble—commits misconduct after deployment and [it] turns out they have PTSD, and be-
cause of justice they lose their benefits, that may not be justice.”  Zoroya, Battle Stress, supra 
note 43 (citing Captain William Nash). 
 153. Zoroya, Troubled Troops, supra note 113. 
 154. Zoroya, Battle Stress, supra note 43. 
 155. Id. (“The Marine Corps had no information about whether the 326 Marines who 
received less-than-honorable discharges and suffered mental health [benefits] were denied VA 
health care services.”). 
 156. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON, HOME FROM THE WAR:  LEARNING FROM VIETNAM VETERANS 
137–38, 156–57 (1992); Alyson Sincavage, Note, The War Comes Home:  How Congress’ 
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intentions, it empowers this sleeper cell and increases the chance of unex-
pected violent or costly behaviors within our own borders the more it pro-
motes the Military Misconduct Catch-22.157  This result is not only shame-
ful,158 but runs contrary to the major premise for justifying the military’s my-
opic focus on good order and discipline:  The very protection of our Ameri-
can society.159 
IV. THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE AND THE THERAPEUTIC IMPERATIVE 
The discussion above highlighted how principles of morality and justice 
fail to address the Military Misconduct Catch-22, and oftentimes contribute 
to it by invoking competing concepts of obligation, such as conservation of 
scarce resources (e.g., waiting for statistical assurances before committing 
resources to hypotheses that do not apply uniformly to individuals).160  The 
interdisciplinary experts who have addressed this problem recognize that 
certain principles of self-interest necessitate policies of prompt and wide-
spread intervention, even when these policies fall short of the harshest jus-
tice.161  Self-interest here is the objective of limiting the known potential for 
a host of negative societal outcomes that assuredly harm public health and 
safety.162  The solution they propose is not necessarily to ignore or exculpate 
misconduct, but to ensure the effective treatment of a dangerous disorder163 
  
Failure to Address Veterans’ Mental Health Has Led to Violence in America, 33 NOVA L. 
REV. 481, 482, 484, 486–87, 507 (2009). 
 157. See LIFTON, supra note 156, at 157–58.  Psychiatrist Robert J. Lifton, who treated 
many Vietnam veterans with PTSD, observed that many are “inundated by imagery of vio-
lence,” and how their pent-up rage is often released unexpectedly through explosive episodes.  
Id. at 138–39, 151–57 (describing three manners in which PTSD-afflicted veterans direct such 
violence).  Reasoning that it is not the experience of rage but how one channels it, Lifton 
concluded that the only way to prevent vicious cycles of violence is by “examining, channel-
ing, and transmuting their rage” through intensive therapy.  Id. at 156. 
 158. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 15. 
 159. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 33 
(explaining that treatment, rather than punishment, of military offenders with PTSD is directly 
related to “the well-being of the Nation that all active duty military members are sworn to 
protect and defend”). 
 160. See discussion supra Part III. 
 161. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 15, 117 (“Pure self-interest should lead us to take 
this step [to ensure that combat veterans remain eligible for VA benefits despite misconduct], 
even if a sense of justice does not.”). 
 162. See Waters & Shay, supra note 151; see also Picard, supra note 41 (“[U]ndiagnosed 
or untreated PTSD and/or TBI puts veterans at an increased risk of suicide, unemployment, 
drug and alcohol abuse, partner violence, and homelessness.”). 
 163. Shay Testimony, supra note 16, at 113 (“I am [not] attempting to exculpate criminals 
who also happen to be combat veterans of their crimes.”). 
33
Seamone: Dismantling America's Largest Sleeper Cell: The Imperative to Tre
Published by NSUWorks, 2013
512 NOVA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37 
that only grows worse the more combat veterans are shut out from the VA, 
which is the single best avenue of treatment that exists.  The treatment solu-
tion is therefore rooted in TJ, not just for the sake of the individual, but more 
for the sake of public health and public safety.164  As retired Connecticut 
Supreme Court Justice Barry Schaller observes: 
The psychiatric profession must promote consideration of PTSD as 
a public health issue rather than simply as an individual mental 
health problem.  The broad reach of combat PTSD within Ameri-
can society, in terms of the number of veterans who develop the 
disorder and the number of people whose lives are directly affect-
ed thereby, qualifies it as a public health issue, meaning one that 
involves the health of communities or populations.165 
Because this mandate for treatment is to prevent known but unquantifiable 
future harm, this therapeutic imperative rests in the related principle of pre-
caution. 
Elsewhere, I have explored the precautionary principle in domestic and 
international law,166 which derives from a government’s self-interest in pro-
tecting its populace and which mandates intervention and the devotion of 
resources to preventive and mitigating efforts, particularly for “‘low proba-
bility, high consequence’ events.”167  Classic examples of such events are 
  
 164. See id. at 115; see also Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military 
Justice, supra note 5, at 28–29. 
 165. SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 202–03; see also Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative 
Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 28–29 (describing how the lethality of the veteran’s 
training makes untreated PTSD a matter of public safety). 
 166. See, e.g., Evan R. Seamone, The Precautionary Principle as the Law of Planetary 
Defense:  Achieving the Mandate to Defend the Earth Against Asteroid and Comet Impacts 
While There is Still Time, 17 GEO. INT’L ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 1–2, 22 (2004) [hereinafter 
Seamone, The Precautionary Principle as the Law of Planetary Defense]; Evan R. Seamone, 
The Duty to “Expect the Unexpected”:  Mitigating Extreme Natural Threats to the Global 
Commons Such as Asteroid and Comet Impacts with the Earth, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 
735, 766–73 (2003) [hereinafter Seamone, The Duty to “Expect the Unexpected”]; see gener-
ally Evan R. Seamone, Note, When Wishing on a Star Just Won’t Do:  The Legal Basis for 
International Cooperation in the Mitigation of Asteroid Impacts and Similar Transboundary 
Disasters, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1091 (2002) [hereinafter Seamone, When Wishing on a Star Just 
Won’t Do]. 
 167. Seamone, When Wishing on a Star Just Won’t Do, supra note 166, at 1095.  This 
term means that “‘while there is only a small possibility that damage could occur, the damage 
that could occur is great.’”  Id. at 1095 n.17; see also STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS 
& OVERSIGHT OF THE H. COMM. ON SCI. & TECH., 98TH CONG., REP. ON THE ENVIRONMENTAL 
IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 9 (Comm. Print. 1984).  In response, “[p]lanning for 
threats that have not yet occurred is one aspect of the duty of self-preservation.”  Seamone, 
The Duty to “Expect the Unexpected,” supra note 166, at 748. 
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natural disasters, communicable crises, and manmade terrorist attacks.168  In 
each instance, although it is difficult—sometimes impossible—to predict 
precisely when the harmful event will occur, when it does, if the government 
and the populace have not taken effective measures to mitigate it, the conse-
quences are most assuredly devastating.169  The vernacular of disease preven-
tion and the governments’ preemptive responsibilities that stem from it is 
particularly appropriate for combat PTSD:  Disaster psychologists, for ex-
ample, have analogized PTSD to a “pathogen,” in the respect that, if untreat-
ed, it will result in the “loss of life through suicide, substance abuse, and 
domestic violence.”170  The veteran sleeper cell analogy raises the related 
concerns of counterterrorism.171 
Continuing the application of the precautionary principle, we can right-
fully label service connected PTSD-based offending as a low probability 
event for three reasons.172  First, the probability is low because not all veter-
ans who experience combat sustain PTSD.173  Second, and relatedly, not all 
veterans who sustain PTSD act in violent or aggressive ways.174  Third, 
PTSD may not be a cause or contributing factor in all criminal offenses 
committed by veterans who have the diagnosis.175  Despite the defense bar’s 
common assertion that all crimes committed by veterans are caused by PTSD 
and that veterans who engage in violent behavior have done so only because 
  
 168. See Seamone, The Precautionary Principle as the Law of Planetary Defense, supra 
note 166, at 9 (addressing “the spread of infectious disease, trans-border forest fires, nuclear 
and radiological emergencies, and terrorist attacks.”). 
 169. Id. at 6–7. 
[G]overnments must be capable of responding to threats of the greatest magnitude at all times.  
Planning for a “worst case scenario” is common in disaster relief circles.  Whether the harm is 
an earthquake, flood, or other natural disaster, the government’s goal must be to withstand 
maximum harm; not only harm that is considered “normal.”  The logic underlying this practice 
recognizes that there may only be one chance to avert significant harm. 
Id. at 7. 
 170. George S. Everly, Jr. & Cherie Castellano, Fostering Resilience in the Military:  The 
Search for Psychological Body Armor, J. COUNTERTERRORISM & HOMELAND SECURITY INT’L, 
Winter 2009, at 12, 13. 
 171. See LIFTON, supra note 156, 156–57; see also supra note 157 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Justin Holbrook & Sara Anderson, Veterans Courts:  Early Outcomes and Key 
Indicators for Success 9–10 (Widener Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series No. 11-
25), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1912655. 
 173. See id. at 9. 
 174. See id. 
 175. See id. at 9–10.  Many argue that these generalizations are harmful to veterans be-
cause they promote a fear-mongering, untrue, “wacko-vet myth.”  Id. at 3, 6–7 (reviewing 
exaggerated concerns that too many veterans are presumed to be violent and dangerous). 
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they were trained to be destructive, this “brutalization” hypothesis176 is hard-
ly a universal truth.177  Neither possibility can be quantified with any preci-
sion and existing studies lead to confused and contradictory results based 
largely on research methodology, self-reports, and populations that cannot be 
generalized.178 
However, low probability in this case does not equate to no probabil-
ity.179  Untreated combat trauma is a low probability, high consequence event 
because, “[f]or a small number of veterans, these stressors are having devas-
tating consequences, including increased risk of suicide.  Taking action 
now—before their problems become more complicated and severe, is in their 
best interests and in the best interest of the [n]ation.”180  Consequences are 
high particularly because of the training that has rendered the veteran lethal 
in combat.181  Many of these war-traumatized troops “often become adamant 
. . . about having loaded guns ready at hand for the purposes of self-defense, 
though there is usually no plausible threat anywhere near their typically sub-
urban neighborhoods.”182  When PTSD is untreated it can be triggered by any 
number of events in a no-notice situation, much like a lone wolf terrorist 
attack.183  As long as combat PTSD and other OSIs result in violent and crim-
  
 176. See BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING, supra note 8, at 344–45.  This hy-
pothesis states that “th[e] process of emotional numbing lead[s] combatants to long-term 
brutalization.”  Id. at 344. 
 177. Id. at 345 (“Though statistical evidence neither proved nor disproved the brutalization 
thesis, the weight of the evidence found veterans ‘innocent.’”). 
 178. Id. 
    179. William B. Brown, War, Veterans, and Crime, in 1 TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINOLOGY 
MANUAL 599, 601 (M. Herzog-Evans ed. 2010) (“[T]he reintegration process, for many veter-
ans, includes their entanglement in the criminal justice system.”). 
 180. Ilem Testimony, supra note 111, at 98. 
 181. See, e.g., BOURKE, AN INTIMATE HISTORY OF KILLING, supra note 8, at 341 (observing 
how lethal skills acquired in training and in combat “disequipped men for life outside war 
zones”) (emphasis added)).  In many cases, once they have returned to civilian society, com-
bat veterans with PTSD are “‘dominated by a fear of their own violence’” or potential for 
violence.  LIFTON, supra note 156, at 138.  One Vietnam veteran used the term “‘the beast in 
me’” to address his “inclination to attack other people suddenly while in a dreamlike state in 
which he was hardly aware of what he was doing.”  Id. at 139.  In 1971, Congressional Medal 
of Honor recipient Sergeant Dwight W. Johnson was killed by a grocery store manager at the 
age of twenty-four while attempting a robbery.  Id. at 39 n.*.  This Vietnam veteran and hero 
in the truest sense who suffered from depression and post-Vietnam syndrome (moniker at the 
time) had voiced the concern to his mental health providers, “‘What would happen if I lost 
control of myself in Detroit and behaved like I did in Vietnam?’”  Id. at 39 n.*, 420 n.*. 
 182. Laurie Calhoun, The Silencing of Soldiers, 16 INDEP. REV. 247, 247 (2011); see also 
THE GROUND TRUTH (Focus Features 2006) (depicting an actual example). 
 183. See, e.g., Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra 
note 5, at 7 n.8 (discussing triggers for PTSD-related stress reactions, including “being cut-off 
by a vehicle on the road, perceiving that someone is staring-down the veteran, or even seeing 
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inal acts, suicide, and other behavior which harms society and families for 
generations to come in some proportion of cases,184 the precautionary princi-
ple mandates that governments, elected officials, and bureaucracies take ef-
fective preventive action, rather than absolving themselves from responsibil-
ity on the basis that these offenders have somehow lost their rights to mental 
health care as a result of military misconduct.  In fact, by placing 
servicemember-specific risks of criminality into the standard hazard profile 
that disaster mitigation specialists commonly use to assess the need for pre-
ventive intervention, military offender risks score among the highest catego-
ries.185  
Evident in the response to Sudden Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
(SARS), infectious disease prevention in that unplanned scenario required a 
proactive approach that eschewed standard—researched and heavily support-
ed—crisis response scripts and demanded practical interventions coupled 
with observations that led to self-correction after observed results.186  A simi-
lar precautionary principle relating to combat veteran offenders is most evi-
  
a Middle-Eastern person”); LIFTON, supra note 156, at 138 (describing a particularly high risk 
of “random violence” from Vietnam veterans who suffered combat trauma); Burgess et al., 
supra note 66, at 66 (reporting the facts of People v. Wood, an Illinois case in which a Vi-
etnam combat veteran was found to be not guilty by reason of insanity for a killing that oc-
curred as a result of noise in a factory that triggered a stress reaction and accompanying disso-
ciative episode); D’Antonio, supra note 65 (citing the findings of the Forgotten Warrior Pro-
ject that “a new shock or stress such as divorce, . . . death in the family, or unemployment can 
trigger antisocial, even criminal, behavior” in combat-traumatized veterans). 
 184. SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 50 (“[S]tudies are not necessary to predict that some types 
of criminal problems will result from the disorder.”).  Consider the prominence of secondary 
trauma suffered by family members, especially children.  Hedley Peach, Australia’s Vietnam 
Veterans:  A Review, 35 AUSTRALIAN FAM. PHYSICIAN 619, 620 (2006).  Studies in this phe-
nomenon have begun to show that the children of combat veterans with PTSD are several 
times more likely themselves to develop psychological maladjustments and even commit 
suicide.  Id. at 621 tbl.2.  Just as PTSD and TBI are the signature injuries of the Iraq and Af-
ghanistan wars, secondary trauma is the signature injury of PTSD veterans’ family members.  
Joseph R. Herzog & R. Blaine Everson, Secondary Traumatic Stress, Deployment Phase, and 
Military Families:  Systemic Approaches to Treatment, in FAMILIES UNDER FIRE:  SYSTEMIC 
THERAPY WITH MILITARY FAMILIES 191, 209 (R. Blaine Everson & Charles R. Figley eds., 
2011). 
   185. See, e.g., LUCIEN G. CATON, EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT STRATEGIES FOR EFFECTIVE 
PROPGRAMS 141 fig.5.7 (2007) (discussing use of the Hazard Profile to rate potential threats to 
public safety and health). 
 186. Herman B. “Dutch” Leonard & Arnold M. Howitt, Against Desperate Peril:  High 
Performance in Emergency Preparation and Response, in COMMUNICABLE CRISES:  
PREVENTION, RESPONSE, AND RECOVERY IN THE GLOBAL ARENA 1, 7–8 (Deborah E. Gibbons 
ed., 2007) (distinguishing “crisis emergencies” from planned emergencies for which there is 
an “executable script or routine that is known or identifiable and that provides a comprehen-
sive, reliable, and fully adequate response”). 
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dent in a recent movement among correctional mental health professionals.187  
In 2009, a series of articles by prominent psychiatrists and psychologists 
urged the corrections community to take immediate action to prevent veteran 
suicide in America’s jails and prisons.188  Recognizing that there were scarce 
data on the prevalence of veterans with PTSD in confinement who later 
committed suicide, they rebuked the prevailing opinion that more research 
was necessary to justify remedial intervention.189  Instead, as reflected in 
Figure 1 below, they looked to the convergence of risk factors that exist 
within the separate populations of prisoners who are at an increased risk of 
suicide and veterans who are at an increased rate of suicide and reasoned that 
the cumulative effect of this mixture is reason enough to prompt action.190 
 
Fig. 1191 
Even without certainty in studies and the status of PTSD as a soft and devel-
oping science, reasonable inferences are justified and immediate preventive 
action is necessary because “[w]hat clearly emerges is that incarcerated vet-
erans are at the intersection between two populations with well-established 
elevations in suicide rate.”192  Alternatively stated, the emerging picture of 
the serious risk posed is sufficient to create a moral obligation to act even in 
  
 187. See Hal S. Wortzel et al., Suicide Among Incarcerated Veterans, 37 J. AM. ACAD. 
PSYCHIATRY & LAW 82, 82, 88–89 (2009). 
 188. See Linda K. Frisman & Felicia Griffin-Fennell, Commentary:  Suicide and Incar-
cerated Veterans—Don’t Wait for the Numbers, 37 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 92, 92 
(2009); Wortzel et al., supra note 187, at 82. 
 189. Wortzel et al., supra note 187, at 87 (“[O]ffering a meaningful estimation of suicide 
rate for [incarcerated veterans] remains impossible, and the . . . hypothesis that incarcerated 
veterans face a high suicide risk can, at present, be neither confirmed nor safely rejected.”). 
 190. Id. & fig.1. 
 191. Id. at 87 fig.1. 
 192. Id. at 87. 
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the absence of many studies serious scientists might desire for comfort in 
policymaking.193 
Common sense dictates the application of the precautionary principle in 
that corrections context, as it does in addressing the Military Misconduct 
Catch-22.  Following identical logic, for example, Warren Quinlan of the 
New England Shelter for Homeless Veterans, urged Congress to create addi-
tional options for securing VA benefits by drawing the following distinction, 
represented in Figure 2, below:  “Separately, combat PTSD is a social and 
legal problem, and veterans with ‘bad paper’ are a social and legal problem.  
The two together produce a dangerous and intractable morass of criminal, 
civil, and domestic dreadfulness.”194 
 
Fig. 2195 
In the same manner as the correctional psychiatrists and psychologists, Quin-
lan’s rationale avoids the types of illogical and absurd justifications pro-
pounded by opponents of arguments rooted only in subjective notions of 
morality or justice.196  Similarly, an actuarial perspective that factors the 
known and certain costs of avoided harm supports intervention rooted in the 
precautionary principle.  This known harm, for which the threat is real, ex-
tends far beyond merely the annual costs of incarceration to “unemployment 
compensation, . . . homeless shelters, substance abuse treatment and emer-
gency health care programs.”197 
  
 193. Frisman & Griffin-Fennell, supra note 188, at 92. 
 194. Quinlan Testimony, supra note 119, at 104. 
 195. Id. 
 196. See supra discussion accompanying notes 55–56. 
 197. Waters & Shay, supra note 162. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Contemporary commentators, like Professor William Brown, who often 
testifies at criminal trials involving PTSD-afflicted veterans,198 are very con-
cerned that the military and society have failed to learn the lessons from Vi-
etnam, particularly regarding those forgotten warriors who subsequently 
committed crimes as a result of their untreated combat PTSD.199  The Mili-
tary Misconduct Catch-22 obviously engenders the same eventual incarcera-
tion, suicide, and societal maladaptation that occurred for far too many Vi-
etnam veterans.200  While the question of what precautions to take may seem 
perplexing, they really are not when we consider many of the historical and 
recurring proposals.201 
The chances of blanket discharge upgrades for all types of military of-
fenders—including sexual predators, child molesters, and murderers—seems 
unlikely and undeserved.  Congress has not changed the VA’s character of 
discharge standards since 1944, even though standards for discharge have 
monumentally changed since then.202  It further blunted President Carter’s 
efforts to upgrade discharges for combat veterans in the aftermath of Vi-
etnam,203 and other more recent requests such as Representative Maxine Wa-
  
 198. Criminal Justice Degree Programs:  William Brown, PhD, W. OR. U., 
https://www.wou.edu/provost/extprogram/cj_online/faculty/brown.php (last visited Apr. 21, 
2013). 
 199. William B. Brown, Another Emerging “Storm”:  Iraq and Afghanistan Veterans with 
PTSD in the Criminal Justice System, JUST. POL’Y J., Fall 2008, at 2, 5–6, 11, 
http://www.cjcj.org/files/another_emerging.pdf; see also, e.g., Marcia G. Shein, Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder in the Criminal Justice System:  From Vietnam to Iraq and Af-
ghanistan, FED. LAW., Sept. 2010, at 42, 46–47; A Groundbreaking Court Decision for Vets 
with PTSD, REUTERS (Oct. 28, 2009, 9:02 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/ 
2009/10/28/idUS147712+28-Oct-2009+PRN20091028. 
 200. See LIFTON, supra note 156, at 157; RICHARD A. KULKA ET AL., TRAUMA AND THE 
VIETNAM WAR GENERATION:  REPORT OF FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIETNAM VETERANS 
READJUSTMENT STUDY 187 (1990); INST. OF MED., supra note 63, at 304. 
 201. See discussion supra Part IV. 
 202. See Hearings on H.R. 523, supra note 121, at 6006–08 (statement of Hon. Philip V. 
Warman, Associate General Counsel of the Veterans’ Administration).  As VA policy analysts 
noted, “the discharge provision . . . and . . . implementing administrative regulations have 
been in effect for in excess of one-quarter of a century, with no indication on the part of . . . 
Congress [or anyone] of any difference of opinion as to the validity of the Veterans Admin-
istration’s interpretation.”  Id. at 6008. 
 203. See, e.g., Nelson v. Shinseki, No. 09-3266, 2011 WL 1897329, at *1 & n.1 (Vet. 
App. May 19, 2011) (discussing how Congress muted President Carter’s Defense Special 
Discharge Review Program, which “generally entitled” bad paper veterans to “an automatic 
upgrade [of their discharge] to either an honorable discharge or a discharge under honorable 
conditions”). 
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ters’ efforts in the early ‘90s to do the same.204  The legislative intent behind 
the statutes related to veterans’ benefits has been, and continues to be, that 
some veterans should be denied medical care and hospitalization based on 
the nature of their misconduct while in the service.205  The VA, on the other 
hand, could improve the quality of its character of service determinations 
through its own administrative regulatory process.  Yet, it too is unlikely to 
adopt a blanket approach.  Unlike the Social Security Administration’s aboli-
tion of a similar character of service process in 1956,206 the VA’s standards 
for willful and persistent misconduct and crimes of moral turpitude derive 
largely from Congress’s explicit concerns when it passed the Servicemens’ 
Readjustment Act of 1944.207 
The optimal choice is confronting the problem while the servicemember 
is still in the force, prior to the time he or she is discharged with bad paper.208  
This is naturally the best opportunity to mitigate societal harm because it 
prevents a waiting game in which time is the enemy of recovery as the veter-
an appeals his or her discharge through a military board, the VA, or both; 
when the need for treatment is unquestionable, it should no longer take half a 
year for an initial determination, and then years for appeals in the VA 
alone.209  Practically, the armed services can conduct more aggressive 
screening and search for opportunities to treat instead of punish in situations 
recommended by health professionals.210 
  
 204. Waters & Shay, supra note 162. 
 205. Hearings on H.R. 523, supra note 121, at 6004–05 (statement of Hon. Philip V. 
Warman, Associate General Counsel of the Veterans’ Administration, citing various state-
ments of legislative intent). 
 206. Id. at 6010–11 (letter of Hon. Robert M. Ball, Commissioner of Social Security, 
describing how the Social Security Administration used to conduct a nearly identical character 
of service determination until December of 1956, when benefits were “provided without re-
gard to the character of the discharge the serviceman received for service after that date”). 
 207. See id. at 6005 (discussion paper submitted for the record by Hon. Philip V. Warman, 
Associate General Counsel of the Veterans’ Administration). 
 208. See, e.g., SCHALLER, supra note 6, at 210 (“[A]ny suggestion that it is acceptable to 
wait until veterans have been charged with crimes before the executive and legislative branch-
es intervene to assist in making them whole is far off the mark.”); Ilem Testimony, supra note 
111, at 98 (“DoD and VA share a responsibility to ensure that war-traumatized service per-
sonnel . . . should not be criminalized before an effort is made to intervene with therapeutic 
remedies.”). 
 209. See, e.g., Hal Bernton, Bronze Star Vet Discharged Without Benefits Gets Good 
News, SEATTLE TIMES (Sept. 8, 2012, 6:01 PM), http://seattletimes. 
com/html/localnews/2019103510_starks09m.html (reporting “an average of five to six 
months” time to conduct an initial character of service determination for an OTH recipient at 
the Portland, Oregon, VA Regional Office). 
 210. Hoellwarth, supra note 64. 
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Additionally, commanders can borrow a page from civilian justice 
agencies and courts by implementing diversionary programs to preserve VA 
benefit eligibility if the veteran succeeds in a course of intensive and super-
vised treatment, whether implemented by military agencies or through civil-
ian problem-solving courts (e.g., drug, domestic violence, mental health 
treatment, or veterans treatment courts).211  Because the option still exists for 
commanders to suspend all forms of crippling administrative and punitive 
discharges based on successful treatment outcomes, military leaders must 
endorse this approach and make it known throughout military mental health 
and legal channels.212  This has been done to address concerns over discharg-
ing servicemembers for personality disorders, which would deprive them of 
benefits for PTSD.213  In such cases, the Army Surgeon General must review 
cases prior to the involuntary separation.214  The military can certainly devel-
op similar protocols for handling of its misconduct cases.215  In a court-
martial, a federal conviction, reduction in rank, and forfeitures in pay can 
surely still meet the goals of deterrence in a case involving PTSD without 
requiring a crippling discharge as well. 
Even in those cases where the offender or the offense is deplorable 
enough to warrant eventual denial of benefits that would potentially displace 
the interests of honorably discharged veterans, the military can liaise with the 
VA and veterans service organizations to provide immediate and transition 
counseling services and effectuate some type of treatment in the months prior 
to discharge after the offender has been designated for the crippling dis-
charge pathway.216  Such efforts can include a preliminary disability evalua-
tion, therapy involving evidence-based PTSD treatments (including family 
members), preparation of one’s own file for discharge upgrade, and occupa-
tional counseling with those few organizations that still render services to 
  
 211. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
28–34. 
 212. See id. at 13–14. 
 213. Kennedy, supra note 53 (describing the Surgeon General’s involvement reviewing 
personality disorder discharges in the Army). 
 214. Id. 
 215. See id. 
 216. It takes months to prepare a case for trial or a separation board and even after the 
announcement of a punitive discharge at court-martial, the offender is not separated from the 
military until appellate review has been completed months later.  See MCM, supra note 34, at 
II-169 (requiring appellate review of all approved court-martial sentences that include “dis-
missal of a commissioned officer, cadet, or midshipman, dishonorable or bad-conduct dis-
charge, or confinement for 1 year or longer”).  During all of this time, the servicemember is 
still in the active military and recent developments permit the VA to devote its treatment 
resources toward active military members.  See Seamone, Attorneys as First Responders, 
supra note 9, at 169, 178–80 (discussing new VA directives). 
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veterans despite the brand of a crippling discharge.  For those overburdened 
military installations located near functioning problem-solving mental health 
or veterans’ treatment courts, program administrators and private clinicians 
can and should conduct outreach efforts and develop memoranda of under-
standing to expand the options available to commanders contemplating dis-
charge for misconduct.217  One notable example is the network of volunteer 
mental health providers assembled by Ray Parrish and Social Worker Johan-
na (Hans) Buwalda, which offers free mental health evaluations to former 
servicemembers across the nation who desire to apply for “Character of Ser-
vice” determinations by the VA.218 
On a final note, rather than abandoning over sixty years of regulatory 
standards within the VA, interdisciplinary experts can and should recom-
mend significant improvements to standardize the vague and undefined con-
cepts like “willful and persistent misconduct” and “moral turpitude” with 
objectively defined and methodological steps using the notice and comment 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act.219  Such reform does not 
require protracted congressional action and can be completed in far less time 
with lasting modifications to the Code of Federal Regulations, while preserv-
ing Congress’s original intent in the statutes.220  A recent testament to such 
revision is the Department of Justice’s monumental shift in 2008 away from 
nearly a century’s worth of precedent221 in redefining the standards for evalu-
  
 217. Seamone, Reclaiming the Rehabilitative Ethic in Military Justice, supra note 5, at 
13–14, 34. 
 218. Johanna (Hans) Buwalda, Spreading the Wealth:  Training Mental Health Providers 
Nationwide to Work with Veterans, VETERAN (Vietnam Veterans Against the War), Spring 
2012, at 8, 8 (describing the efforts of Vietnam Veterans Against the War to “develop[] a 
network of providers across the country that is willing to provide free, quality mental health 
services”).  Disabled American Veterans is another organization that provides services to 
PTSD-afflicted veterans and has attempted to address this concern with Congress.  See Ilem 
Testimony, supra note 111, at 93–94, 96. 
 219. See, e.g., William A. Moorman & William F. Russo, Serving Our Veterans Through 
Clearer Rules, 56 ADMIN. L. REV. 207, 208–11, 213, 217 (2004) (describing how the adminis-
trative rulemaking process could more quickly and effectively eliminate ambiguity in VA 
regulations than the legislative process). 
 220. Administrative agencies often fill in the gaps where statutes may be ambiguous and 
courts accord great deference when they do so.  WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., 
LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 322–23 (2d ed. 2006) (describing the Supreme 
Court’s longstanding deferential position on agency rulemaking and related interpretations). 
 221. Cate McGuire, Note, An Unrealistic Burden:  Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude and 
Silva-Trevino’s Realistic Probability Test, 30 REV. LITIG. 607, 615 (2011) (describing how the 
Attorney General “upset almost 100 years of jurisprudence” within the Board of Immigration 
Appeals in creating a new method to define moral turpitude offenses). 
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ating whether an alien has been convicted of a crime of “moral turpitude” 
under the Immigration and Nationality Act.222 
While none of the above recommendations will end all veteran crimi-
nality, catch all cases of PTSD, or guarantee the success of all treatment 
plans or collaborative efforts between the military and society, no single in-
tervention could ever realistically accomplish all of these goals.  Instead, the 
efforts would reach a population that is treated as invisible for generations.  
By addressing the Military Misconduct Catch-22 head on, we might finally 
“bring home” these lost divisions of combat-traumatized veterans who con-
tinue to wage wars in our neighborhoods, our hospitals, our psychiatric 
wards, and our prisons and jails each day.  Recognizing society’s dire inter-
est in the servicemember’s un-crippled transition, the precautionary principle 
demands no less than TJ in action.  Otherwise, through the failure to treat 
this particularly devastating and lethal form of mental illness in the most 
dangerous offenders, the military and society will only contribute to the 
ranks of America’s largest sleeper cell, defeating itself from the inside out 
with each discarded troop’s preventable clash with the law. 
 
  
 222. See Matter of Cristoval Silva-Trevino, 24 I. & N. Dec. 687, 688, 691 (2008) (address-
ing the provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act). 
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